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CHAPTER ONE 
 
Introduction 
This submission is based on reflection, and scholarship, arising out of a career spanning four 
decades, divided between professional journalistic practice, teaching and research. The 
selected works, and this commentary, reflect my efforts to shed light on a range of ethical and 
professional journalistic issues, with two major strands running between them. First, an 
attempt to use my experience as a practitioner to provide a better understanding of the 
processes of journalism in general, and political journalism in particular, and in so doing to 
play a small part in the continuing efforts to bridge the long-standing gulf between media 
academics and practitioners. And second, to confront and engage with the current state of 
political communications in the UK. 
 
Having called this submission ―A Crisis in Political Communications? Reflections of a 
Critical Practitioner‖, it would seem appropriate to begin this commentary by addressing this 
'crisis‘ – if there is one. Many of the articles and chapters being submitted here do reflect the 
general tenor of those described as being part of the ‗crisis school‘ (Davies 2010, Margaretten 
and Gaber 2012). Broadly this defines a group of scholars who argue that the quality of 
public and political debate, deliberation and participation, has been in systemic decline for 
the past three decades or so (Blumler and Gurevitch 1995, Dahlgren 1995, Fallows 1996, 
Postman 1985, Golding, Murdock and Schlesinge1986, Franklin 2004 and many others) and 
hence the quality of our democracy has also been deteriorating.  However, in the course of 
producing this submission I have decided to place a question mark after the word ‗crisis‘. 
Certainly the past three decades represent perhaps the most dramatic and concentrated period 
of change in modern British political communications history but whether that amounts to a 
‗crisis‘ is something that is discussed later in this commentary. 
 
The Public Sphere Reconsidered 
Any discussion about a 'crisis' in political or public communications must inevitably take as a 
starting point, either implicitly or explicitly, Jurgen Habermas's notion of the public sphere as 
set out in ―The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere‖ (Habermas 1989) and 
subsequently revised and  amended by Habermas and others (Calhoun 1992, Goode 2005). 
There has been much debate about the underpinning concept, the historical accuracy - for 
Dahlgren a ―melancholic historical narrative‖ (Dahlgren 1995:8) - and the contemporary 
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utility of Habermas‘s characterisation of the development of the European public sphere 
between the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries (Calhoun 1992). My own position is that 
Habermas‘s characterisation does contain theoretical shortcomings and historical inaccuracies 
but that does not diminish the underlying importance of the public sphere as a conceptual tool 
for investigating the discursive processes of contemporary politics. This is a view very much 
in line with Castells‘ description of the public sphere as ―a useful intellectual construct‖ 
(Castells 2008: 80). 
 
In discussing the contemporary public sphere I will be using the term in the generally 
accepted sense of the word, rather than in any specific Habermassian sense; that is as a space 
where the private realm, the economic sphere, organised civil society and the political class 
notionally come together – mediated by both the traditional media and new media - to discuss 
current events, formulate policy and initiate political action. (Curran 1991) Davies literally 
sees the public sphere whilst gazing down on the atrium of Portcullis House, one of 
Parliament‘s main internal meeting places (Davies 2010). He sees conversations taking place 
there in the cafes and restaurants, between politicians, their staff and those who are anxious to 
meet with them to discuss, argue and lobby on matters of public and private policy.  It is a 
seductive vision but, I would argue, somewhat misleading. This is because what Davies is 
actually seeing is a very partial view of today's public sphere. First, because only the more 
articulate and privileged of representatives of civil society, the private realm and the 
economic sphere, actually gain access to Portcullis House  (lesser mortals have to content 
themselves with hurried conversations with MPs in the Central Lobby of the House of 
Commons). Second, that in addition to the absence of those 'below the radar',  there is also an 
absence of those 'above the radar' - ministers, senior civil servants and other agents of state 
power  who rarely venture into such spaces, precisely because they do not wish to be 
accosted by those whose attentions they would prefer to avoid. 
 
Thus Portcullis House is a seductive but essentially misleading representation of today‘s 
public sphere. Unlike the coffee houses of Habermas's articulation, the contemporary public 
sphere is no longer, if it ever was, a single group of merchants and political writers discussing 
new ideas and formulating political demands.  The contemporary public sphere is multi-
faceted as Habermas concedes when he writes that it is probably unhelpful ―to speak of one 
public sphere‖ (Calhoun 1992: 424) and Todd Gitlin sees the ―unitary public sphere‖ as 
―weak, riddled with anxiety and self-doubt‖ (Gitlin 1998:170).  Thus it seems that something 
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of a consensus has developed around the notion not of one sphere but as a series of smaller 
overlapping ones- Gitlin‘s term (1998) is ―sphericules‖ for Dahlgren (1995) it is ―many and 
multi-dimensional public spheres‖ (see also Gitlin 1998, McNair 2000, Temple 2006 and 
Gripsrud 2010).   
 
Some of these spheres will reflect policy areas (health, education), some will represent 
special interests (disabilities, ethnicity, faith groups) and some will have a geographic 
demarcation. These spheres, or sphericules, I would suggest, are neither discrete between 
themselves nor do they necessarily have national boundaries; for both the growth of disaporic 
communities (Silverstone 2006) and the increased role of transnational businesses and 
international organisations (such as the European Union) have made these smaller spheres 
overlapping, porous and fragmentary.  At the centre of these spheres, or sphericules, is what I 
interpret to be Dahlgren‘s political public sphere (Dahlgren 1995:7) - the politicians, the civil 
servants and the media.  
 
While this characterisation of the political public sphere pre-dates the digital revolution it still 
holds good today, despite it being much impacted and transformed by the changes in 
information and communication technology which we have witnessed over the past three 
decades.  There are no longer single conversations taking place within and between the 
sphericules and the central political public sphere, but instead there is a multitude of 
cacophonous voices talking and, occasionally, shouting at each other. And the digital 
revolution has meant that the speed and quantity of information and opinion being publicly 
exchanged has increased exponentially. But the key question to be addressed relates to the 
tenor of the discourses, and the resulting policy decisions that flow from them; and that 
question is: does more information and opinion improve the quality of decision-making and 
hence the quality of our democracy? The answer relates back to the main theme of this 
commentary – is there, as Blumler and Gurevitch (1995) termed it ―a crisis in public 
communication‖? If the answer is yes then a further question is begged – namely, is the crisis 
more or less fixed in nature or is it dynamic and, in normative terms, can the direction of 
travel be seen as positive or negative? Or was there never a crisis in the first place?  The 
items submitted here represent evolving research and commentary around these questions; 
they represent various manifestations of what I have perceived to be the crisis, going back 
over the past 30 years. But this commentary is being written in 2013 and there are a number 
of electronic straws in the wind suggestive of the fact that contemporary political 
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communications are in the process of dramatically changing, or appearing to change, what 
Gans (2010)  terms the ‗democratic conversation‘, and not necessarily for the worse. 
 
Journalists and Politicians 
Lord Justice Leveson‘s report (Leveson 2012) into the ethics and practices of the British press 
was primarily focussed on his proposals for regulatory reform of the press as was the debate 
that followed its publication. However, his report also carried an extensive commentary on 
the current state of relations between politicians and the media (Gaber 2013B). He concluded 
his review with a very positive summation of relations between politicians and the media that 
almost defined the politics/media nexus within a healthy political public sphere: 
― ….. the overwhelming evidence [is] that relations between politicians and the press on a 
day to day basis are in robust good health and performing the vital public interest 
functions of a free press in a vigorous democracy, providing an open forum for public 
debate, enabling a free flow of information and challenge and holding power to account.‖  
(Leveson 2012: 1117). 
 
Leveson‘s view is in stark contrast to that expressed by Tony Blair in his valedictory lecture 
about the state of political journalism in Britain. The former Prime Minister bemoaned what 
he saw as the media‘s obsession with controversy and, in particular, their sub-text that, ―It is 
not enough for someone to make an error. It has to be venal. Conspiratorial.‖ (Blair 2007).  
And he went on to suggest (in words that very much reflected a view of relations between the 
press and politics that some contemporary commentators were then propagating (Lloyd 
2004)) that    ―... today's media, more than ever before, hunts in a pack. In these modes it is 
like a feral beast, just tearing people and reputations to bits.‖ (Blair 2007).  Blair's complaint 
could be seen as validation of the position of the 'crisis school' – namely that our democratic 
conversation is discordant and, as a result, the political public sphere is impoverished and, 
arguably, ―not fit for purpose‖.i 
 
However, the problem with such an argument is that it implies a certain 'golden ageism'.  It 
suggests there was a time when relations between politicians and journalists were healthy, 
when public trust in politicians was high and the democratic system functioned in good order 
(Temple 2006). But the actual evidence for this is scant, to say the least. As part of the 1977 
Royal Commission on the Press (Finer and McGregor 1977), Seymour-Ure investigated the 
then state of relations between the Press and Parliament. He began his report by opining 
that:"The relations of Parliament and the Press are full of tension, mutual suspicion and 
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political conflict. This is a commonplace." He went on to say, "Newspapers share a golden 
age myth about the quality and influence of Parliament, particularly in their comments on 
elections.  Parliamentary memoirs [also] suggest a golden age myth about the Press." 
(Seymour-Ure 1977: 89).  Thus the 'crisis-driven' observer needs to tread with some care, for 
whilst it might well be the case that there never was a 'golden age' it is probably safe to 
suggest that if things were bad in 1977, they are now, in many ways, worse – worse, that is, in 
terms of public disillusionment with, and disengagement from, the political process. 
(However, statements such as this need to be made with care, since the term ‗worse‘ implies a 
number of normative assumptions so perhaps it might be less problematic to say that today 
things are just very ‗different‘.)  
 
Certainly in terms of an apparent decline in public trust in both politicians and the media, it is 
easy to make the case for a crisis. According to recent Ipsos Mori research, trust in politicians 
is low and getting lower. Only 14% of those surveyed in 2011 ―trusted politicians to tell the 
truth‖ and just 19% similarly trusted journalists – even bankers, at 29%, rated more highly. 
(Ipsos Mori 2011). And, following the MPs expenses scandal of 2009, those believing that 
MPs did not have a ‗high moral code‘ increased from 35% in 1985 to 59% in 2013 (Murphy 
2013). And although too much emphasis should not be placed on such polling it is probably 
indicative of a longer-term trend in which trust in public institutions, not just in politics and 
the media, but across a range of fields (religion, the police, the banks), has declined. In more 
formal terms the decline in public belief in the efficacy of the current system can be tracked 
against a range of other measures including turnout at elections and membership of political 
parties. However, a counter argument, using other data, can be made by looking at survey 
results that indicate, for example, increased public participation in campaigning activities, a 
rise in membership of special interest groups and a greater willingness to contact MPs and 
councillors (Stanyer 2004, Hansard Society 2012). 
 
Blumler’s developing ‘crisis in public communication’ 
 In considering the health of the political public sphere, or Gans‘ ―democratic conversation‖, I 
am focussing on the central relationship within that sphere, namely that between journalists 
and politicians. In writing about this issue I have been much influenced by the work of  
Blumler and Gurevitch (1995) who pioneered the systemic approach to the study of political 
communications and were among the first to identify the  ―Crisis of Public Communication‖, 
based on their almost thirty years of observing election coverage at the BBC between 1966 
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and 1992. When Blumler first began his research about election coverage in the UK he did 
not perceive of it being in a ‗crisis. In one of his first studies he and McQuail (1968) 
concluded that the political communications system in the UK, as they observed it during the 
1964 election, was functioning well, giving the maximum number of citizens the chance to be 
exposed to the views of the main political parties (Blumler and McQuail 1968: 286).  And 
when Blumler and Gurevitch looked at political communications in the elections of 1983 in 
the UK election and 1984 in the US (Semetko et al 1991) they compared Britain favourably, 
noting that in the UK election coverage was less game-orientated, more substantive, gave 
politicians more scope to set the campaign agenda, less professionalised and that British 
journalists‘ attitude to politicians was more ―sacerdotal‖ than ―disdainful‖ – their two 
principle descriptors. They attributed these positive attributes largely to the existence of a 
sizeable public service broadcasting sector in the UK which was imbued with what they 
described as a "civic mission" (Semetko et al. 1991).    
 
However, in the light of their later observations at the BBC, they subsequently revised their 
verdict on the British system, charting a declining public service broadcasting ethos which 
they held as being largely responsible for what they were now calling a ―crisis‖ in public 
communication. They observed that journalists (not just in the BBC) were becoming ever 
more‖disdainful‖ of politicians in their election coverage. They suggested that journalists 
viewed politicians and parties through an increasingly cynical lens and saw election coverage 
more and more in terms of a contest – not between the politicians but between the politicians 
and the media. In this contest the journalists first sought to decode how the politicians were 
attempting to gain control of the daily election news agenda and then sought to devise 
strategies as to how to nullify such manoeuvres (Blumler and Gurevitch 1995: 104). This 
approach, Blumler and Gurevitch contrasted with what they had described earlier as a more 
‖sacerdotal‖ approach to election coverage – the notion that journalists, particularly public 
service broadcasters, had an obligation to provide the fairest election coverage possible as 
part of the democratic political process (Ibid: 56). 
 
In The Crisis of Public Communication  Blumler and Gurevitch (1995) observed that as a 
result of this increase in pragmatic coverage the political communication process was tending 
to ―strain against, rather than with the grain of citizenship‖ and they warned ―our civic 
arteries are hardening.‖ (Ibid: 203). They described the crisis as involving an ever-increasing 
cynicism among political reporters - pace the infamous Paxman quote ―Why is this lying 
Ivor Gaber: A Crisis in Political Communications? Reflections of a Critical Practitioner submitted as part of a PhD by Prior Publication 
 
9 
bastard lying to me?‖ (Wells 2005) - an emphasis upon politics as a game played by both 
sides, an intensification of competition among and between politicians and journalists, an 
exponential growth in sources of political news and opinion and finally "the emergence of a 
post-deferential culture‖ (Blumler and Gurevitch 1995: 206). The consequences of this crisis, 
as they saw it, was to create a general sense of cynicism about politics among the public, an 
emphasis on politics as a game rather than as a means of policy formulation and 
implementation, an exclusion of the public from the political process and a ―catapulting‖ of 
the press into ―a position of surrogate opposition‖ (Ibid: p. 214).   
 
However, by 2001 Blumler and Gurevitch were starting to wonder whether the digital 
revolution could, in their words, be ―redemptive‖ because ―the Internet allows direct 
communication between citizens and politicians, enabling both to bypass the media. Here, 
then, may lie the Internet‘s greatest potential for change‖ (Blumler and Gurevitch 2001). 
Blumler was, at this stage, conflicted both wondering whether the Internet might not 
represent some means of transcending the crisis and at the same time seeing the crisis 
worsening.  Writing in 2010, now with Coleman, he appears to see no let-up in the crisis, 
describing the UK political communications system as ‗bust ...sapping the vitality of 
democratic political culture.‖ (Blumler and Coleman 2010:140) and seeing the media/politics 
nexus as ―a toxic relationship ... [leaving] citizens experiencing increasing unease, confusion, 
and scepticism.‖ Ibid). But at the same time suggesting that the new media might be 
―redemptive‖ - a means of reinvigorating the political public sphere. He and Coleman call for 
what they describe as a new kind of public institution - an‖online civic commons‖. This, they 
suggest, could enhance the political public sphere and ―[do] for democratic citizenship in the 
digital age what public service broadcasting did for analogue democracy.‖ Such an 
institution, they argue, could create a means for journalists, politicians and the public to 
reconnect, acting as a clearing house for the views of the citizens which should then be 
promoted and developed as cues for political action at both the local and national level. 
  
‘News Intensification’ and the Growth of Spin 
Even if suggestions that the digital revolution is opening up new discursive spaces which 
might allow ordinary citizens to have a greater voice, might be seen as over-optimistic, these 
new spaces are, to some extent, having a major impact on the lives and working practices of 
politicians, journalists and campaigners.
ii
  Political journalists‘ daily routines are now 
virtually unrecognisable from those described by media scholars in the middle of the last 
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century (see Seymour-Ure 1968, Tunstall 1970, Hencke 2011, Gaber 2000, 2011 and 2013a).   
As a result of the digital revolution a process of ‗news intensification‘   - with journalists 
having more (much more) news and information at their disposal but, at the same time, 
having to service a whole myriad of new platforms – has been underway (Hencke 2011, 
Gaber 2011, 2013a and 2013b).  Long gone are the days when the gentleman correspondent, 
sitting in one of Westminster's many bars and watering holes, would glance at his watch at 
four o‘clock in the afternoon and ask himself (and it was almost invariably a ‗him‘) "On what 
am I opining about tonight?‖; instead journalists now find themselves serving many, arguably 
too many, platforms leaving little time for thought, reflection or verification - a state of affairs 
captured by the Guardian's David Hencke, who, when as Chair of the Parliamentary Press 
Gallery, wrote: 
―….while two decades ago a reporter could get away with just one story for next day‘s 
issue, now that same reporter can find him or herself with quadruple the amount of work. 
Not only does the paper‘s website want an instant story, but it may require a political blog 
on that story, an update for the next day‘s paper and a podcast for that evening‘s refreshed 
website.‖(Hencke 2011: 54).  
 
But there have been other substantive changes taking place in the media, apart from changes 
in technology, captured by terms such as  ‖dumbing down‖  (Barnett 1998),  ‖tabloidisation‖ 
(Esser 1999),   ‖infotainment‖ (Franklin 1997)  and ‖churnalism‖ (Davies 2006). These terms 
relate both to particular changes, but also suggest a decline in the quality of the information 
available to the public on the major political issues of the day. And although there is a great 
deal of evidence to support this argument, some of which is covered in the articles included 
in this submission, two observations need to be made. The first is that whilst the quality of 
political information and commentary might have declined, there can be no gainsaying that 
the actual quantity of information available to the public has never been greater.  On a daily 
basis there has been a marked increase in daily newspaper paginations, the BBC 24-hour 
radio and TV news channel and Sky News update events on an hourly basis, the political 
websites diffuse political information minute-by-minute and blogspots and political news 
pours out of Twitter literally every second.  
 
The other observation is that at the same time as political journalists have been learning how 
to live with this intensification of news, so too have those on the other side of the wire – the 
politicians and their media teams. As the demand for political news has increased (if not 
among audiences certainly in terms of the available time and space to be filled in both the 
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traditional and new media), so too has the power of the media managers increased as the 
demand for their ‗product‘ outstrips supply. In one sense this has always been the case in that 
the sophisticated media managers, or spin doctors, haves always known when, and when not, 
to feed the ‗feral beast‘ of Tony Blair‘s imaginings. Although as Blair himself conceded they 
(New Labour) did overplay this particular hand when he wrote: ―We paid inordinate attention 
in the early days of New Labour to courting, assuaging, and persuading the media‖ (Blair 
2005).  
 
Even though there was nothing new in governments seeking to control the media (Lloyd 
George, a century ago, gave one of the best definitions yet of spin doctoring when he said, 
―The Press? What you can't square you squash and what you can't squash you square 
―(Margach1978: 13)) if one is attempting to delineate the first modern spin doctor one would 
not start with Alastair Campbell, as many commentators do. Before Campbell there was 
Margaret Thatcher's astute, and occasionally brutal, press secretary Bernard Ingham and 
before him, no less astute and no less brutal, was Harold Wilson's Joe Haines. Even further 
back there was the former journalist Francis Williams who effectively insulated Clement 
Attlee from any contact with the press but, at the same time, sought to ensure that what 
coverage there was reflected a positive message about him and his Government. However, it 
would be tendentious to argue that just because one is able to identify ‗spin doctors‘ of the 
past, the modern phenomenon of spin amounts only to a difference of degree or 
sophistication.  
 
Drawing on my own 30 years‘ experience in and around Westminsteriii,  it is clear that the 
growth of the spin culture, even before the process of news intensification really gained 
momentum,  was making a profound difference to the day-to-day relations between 
politicians and journalists. Two examples will suffice. The first relates to my experience as a 
broadcaster back in the 1970s. In those days if I needed an interview with a particular 
politician - front or backbencher - I would more often than not simply go and look around the 
members‘ lobby of the House of Commons (no mobile phones, or pagers in those days) and 
make a direct approach, or leave a message for the relevant politician asking him or her to 
phone me. Now such an approach would be unthinkable. Even the humblest of backbenchers 
has a team of researchers, secretaries, and even spin doctors, who simultaneously seek to 
erect a wall around their politician to protect him or her from unwelcome media approaches 
but also to act as celebrity agents seeking to place their ‗star‘ in as many desirable media 
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outlets as possible. Requests for interviews – ‗bids‘ as they are known in the trade – have to 
be made through the correct channels  and are as frequently turned down as accepted. 
 
The second example relates to the ‗supply‘ of political news.  Before the advent of the 
internet, politicians‘ main means of communicating with the media was through the printed 
press release, either delivered by hand, or left on a table in the House of Commons‘ Press 
Gallery. One could stay abreast of almost all political happenings of the day by a daily glance 
at the press table, turning up for the occasional press conference and attending the twice daily 
briefings given by the Prime Minister‘s Press Secretary. The briefings remain (although they 
are now also posted online) but virtually everything else has changed. The internet, email, 
social media and text messaging are now the parties‘ and politicians‘ principle means of 
communicating with the media and the flow is unceasing – for example, in just one month 
(March 2013) the Labour Party posted 131 press releases on its website, an average of more 
than four a day (Labour 2013). Politicians, or in most cases their staff, now send/spin their 
own messages, or rebut their opponents‘, using new media, on an almost 24/7 basis. The 
scope for the creative spin doctor is almost unlimited. 
 
A Digital Dawn? 
But it would be fallacious to suggest that the degree to which communications between 
politicians and journalists has been so dramatically transformed in recent years has only 
changed the relationship between the two by a matter of degree. The change has been 
substantive and the real question is whether that change has improved or degraded the quality 
of the democratic conversation and hence the effective functioning of the political public 
sphere. Certainly there are those scholars of political communication (Norris 2000, McNair 
2003) who have argued that the culture of spin has, on the whole, been beneficial to the 
process of public understanding. They argue that the increased use of techniques of media 
management by politicians has resulted in greater clarity in their communications, as they, 
and their advisers, seek to hone a message into language and concepts that are more easily 
understood by the general public. The process has also, as Sky‘s Political Editor, Adam 
Boulton, has suggested, given journalists greater insight into politicians‘ thinking and has also 
given them a greater flow of authoritative information with which to work, compared to the 
days of the ubiquitous ―no comment‖ (Boulton 2012).  
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On the other side of the argument a number of scholars (Barnett and Gaber 2001, Franklin 
2004 and Jones 1995, 1999 and 2002) have seen in the greater practice of the so-called ‗dark 
arts‘ of spin, a trend that has enabled politicians to craft messages that conceal as much as 
they reveal and then to seek to seduce potentially friendly journalists whilst at the same time 
neutralising potentially hostile ones – in other words ‗spin control‘. As I wrote: ―One of the 
most significant developments  within the British political system over the past few decades 
has been the establishment of  ‗presentation‘ as the central philosophy not just of the practice 
of politics but of its content as well.‖  (Barnett and Gaber: 96).   
 
But a more positive argument can be made about the current state of political 
communications in Britain – one that links to the guarded optimism of Blumler and Coleman 
(2010) - and that is as follows: that as a result of the digital revolution we could be witnessing 
not just the beginnings of the end of ‗spin‘ but the creation of a more healthy political public 
sphere. For the democratic conversation, for so long dominated by the voices of the 
politicians and journalists, can now be joined by literally anybody with access to a computer 
and an internet connection, resulting in the demarcation lines between mainstream political 
journalists, politicians and the public (as citizen journalists, campaigners, bloggers and so 
forth) becoming increasingly blurred.  Whilst recognising that an article, and even a blog 
posting, by an established political correspondent from a traditional newspaper or 
broadcasting outlet, still has far more impact and influence than the unknown citizen 
journalist opining on her own personal blogspot, this is increasingly becoming only a matter 
of degree.  
 
The other notable trend which is changing the balance of power between the old and the new 
media in the political debate is that it is no longer the case, if it ever was, that the new media 
is all about opinion whilst the old media are essentially about news - here another blurring is 
taking place. Ever since the ascendancy of television as the main source of news, newspapers 
have been retreating from news coverage per se and becoming more reliant on features and 
opinion as a means of differentiating themselves in a very crowded marketplace (Franklin 
1997). Conversely the political blogosphere, which began life in the UK as a space for the 
opinionated (as opposed to the blogosphere in the US which always had a substantive news-
breaking function) has become a growing source of news. Guido Fawkes‘ ‗Order Order‘ iv on 
the right, for instance,  and the Huffington Post
v
 on the left – contain almost as much news as 
opinion (which in itself is almost a difference without a distinction, since particular opinions 
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expressed by particular actors can, in themselves, constitute news). Equally, pronouncements 
on Conservative Home
vi
 – because it is seen to speak authoritatively for the Conservative 
grassroots - make news in their own right.  Twitter, the micro-blogging site, might be 
dominated by opinion but it is also a site for breaking news and hence has become an 
indispensable platform for journalists and politicians alike (and for anyone else who wants to 
monitor political events and opinions) (Gaber 2011). Facebook can also be an invaluable 
source of non-mainstream political news. One very minor example was the announcement of 
the formation of a ‗Friends of Israel in UKIP‘ groupvii and the debate that followed (the 
Group being seen as a possible ‗distraction‘ from UKIP‘s main focus). This would not have 
registered on any mainstream journalist‘s radar, no matter how focused on the minutiae of 
British politics he or she was, were it not for a Facebook posting by the group. The posting 
also told us that the existence of the group had provoked the far-right British National Party 
to denounce UKIP for ‗selling out to the Zionist lobby‖viii – an example of one of those 
slightly exotic ‗flowers‘ of political information that only grows within the walls of the digital 
walled garden.  
 
So all this digital activity begs the question: can one reconcile this massive tidal wave of 
news, information and opinion with the notion formulated early in the last century by John 
Dewey who suggested that the ―cultivation of a culture of communication‖ should form the 
basis of a civilised democratic discourse (Dewey 1927)? Some scholars (Dutton 1996, Davies 
1999) have suggested that cyberspace is no place for nurturing such a culture, but as Blumler 
and Gurevitch noted, users of new technologies begin to ―adjust their behaviour in line with 
what are perceived to be the medium‘s distinctive characteristics‖ (Blumler and Gurevitch 
2001: 5) – and there is more recent work to support such an argument.  
 
Zizi Papacharissi has investigated the tone and texture of the online democratic conversation 
and concluded that it was more‖civil‖ than anecdotal evidence might suggest. She looked at 
the competing claims of, on the one hand, those who might be characterised as cyber-
utopians, who suggest that the online environment offers a discursive space that increases 
political participation and, in her words could ―pave the road for a democratic utopia‖ 
(Papacharissi 2004: 260) against the claims of the cyber-dystopians who say that political 
discussion on social media is ―fragmented, nonsensical and enraged‖ (ibid). She looked at the 
extent to which online debate could be described as ―civil‖ by investigating 300 such debates 
and found, perhaps surprisingly, that amid the shouting and screaming - and contrary to the 
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anecdotal evidence - most of the posted messages were in fact ―civil‖. She suggests that this 
is because cyberspace does not involve face-to-face communication. She claims that her 
study ―supported the internet‘s potential to revive the public sphere‖ (ibid: 280). 
 
There is other evidence to hand that also suggests the first flowerings of an electronic user-
generated democracy. The media, particularly the broadcasters, have long realised the 
attraction to audiences of providing spaces of interactivity – call-in shows on radio attract 
some of the largest audiences. But when this media interactivity is combined with social 
media, the power of electronic public opinion to shift issues onto both the media‘s and the 
politicians‘ agendas can be impressive.  One example came in 2013 with the appointment of 
Paulo Di Canio, a man with a background of support for fascism, as manager of Sunderland 
football club. It very rapidly became a major mainstream and new media issue. Within hours 
of his appointment being announced supporters of Sunderland, and others, swamped the 
phone-in lines, the blogs, the Twitter feeds and the Facebook postings to protest. This would 
have been a major a story in its own right but the speed, intensity (and quality) of the public 
online response made it impossible for the football club to suggest that this was something 
only of interest to the media and completely irrelevant to the average Sunderland supporter. 
Similarly, the death of Lady Thatcher in 2013 witnessed a public debate about her legacy, on 
the old and new media, which only the cynical could dismiss as a mere cacophony of voices. 
 
A few years ago it might have been tempting to dismiss the online debates and discussions as 
being confined to relatively small groups of techno-savvy obsessives, but that line is now 
difficult to hold. Latest figures suggest that 40% of the UK adult population now access news 
digitally on mobile devices, the highest rate in Europe (Dutton and Black 2011), that two 
thirds of UK consumers now visit at least one social media site every day (Ofcom 2011) and 
60% of all internet users in the UK maintain some form of online profile - the highest 
penetration rates for social networks anywhere in the world (Newman 2011).  Hence, the 
growth of social media might just signal the beginnings of the fulfilment of Habermas‘s 
notion of ―universal access to the public sphere‖ that scholars have identified as critical to its 
realisation (Schlesinger and Tumber: 9). 
 
And it is not just one way traffic on the information super highway - more and more 
politicians are now listening and responding to voices from cyberspace. Not so many years 
ago any politician who took the trouble to draft a press release, even hand-written, and take it 
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up to the Westminster press gallery, was regarded as almost a cutting edge communicator.  
Today the majority of MPs use social media, often as their main form of public 
communication, with Twitter the fastest growing medium.   As of March 2013 409 out of 650 
MPs had Twitter accounts, compared with 331 the year before and 51 in the year before that.
ix
 
Though as I have pointed out
x
  just because an MP has a Twitter account, it does not mean 
that they can be considered active users of the service (Margaretten and Gaber 2012). Usage 
can vary enormously. A recent paper from the Parliament Street think tank  discovered that 
one MP – Di Havard - had just 56 followers and had yet to tweet (as of April 2013); on the 
other hand another – Tom Watson MP – had over 90,000 followers and sometimes tweeted up 
to 40 times a day
xi
.  
 
Twitter might be one way of reversing some of the negative trends that have been discussed 
in this commentary. In a jointly authored paper with Margaretten, we wrote: 
―Crisis scholars generally hold that the rift between the public and politicians threatens 
democracy, and they look towards the ability of Computer Mediated Communications 
(CMCs) to expand and redefine the public sphere as a means of addressing mistrust and 
reversing the trend towards a widespread de-legitimising of democratic institutions‖ 
(Margaretten and Gaber 2012: 2). 
 
Whilst CMCs might be one way of improving the quality of the discourse within the political 
public sphere we warned that it was a far from universal panacea. However, for scholars of 
political communication, it could prove to be an invaluable resource, as we noted: 
―Twitter‘s brief and data-driven and nature, when combined with its growing ubiquity and 
increased adoption by elected officials, creates an extraordinary opportunity for academics 
to study political messaging, both for its discursive elements and what it can tell us about 
the behaviour of politicians. It is a valuable resource that scholars of political 
communication should now be looking to exploit.‖ (Ibid: 19). 
  
It is appropriate to be cautious when hailing the arrival of ‗a new dawn‘ (in Tony Blair‘s 
memorable phrase on the morning of his 1997 election victory) as Blumler and Gurevitch 
(2001: 6) observed, ―Politicians and their publicity advisers will certainly not be 
automatically cleansed of their original communication sins just by the advent of the new 
media!‖, But there are other straws in the electronic wind – in addition to the research 
findings discussed above – that are suggestive that even if the new dawn hasn‘t yet broken, 
the darkness of the night is beginning to fade.  Liberal Democrat MP Tom Brake was first 
elected to the Commons in 1997, he is now Deputy Leader of the House of Commons and a 
Facebook enthusiast. He boasts of having 5,000 followers (almost a quarter of his actual vote) 
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and fervently believes that social media are having a major impact on the quality of British 
democracy. Writing for the Huffington Post, Brake (2013) says that, for him, social media is a 
vital tool for reaching his constituents. He believes it has made him a better MP and has also 
forced him to rethink how he engaged with local people; as a result he has modified his 
behaviour, taking into account that his constituents see themselves just as much as 
‗consumers‘ as ‗voters‘. And the experience has reinforced his belief that people will engage 
with politics but only if the political debate is pitched to them in terms that they find 
accessible (Brake 2013).  
 
Brake‘s enthusiasm for social media might be premature but, for those of us who have been 
writing about and pondering, the crisis in political communication, it certainly provides, at 
the very least, pause for thought, if not radical revision. As Blumler and Gurevitch predicted: 
―...the Internet allows direct communication between citizens and politicians, enabling 
both to bypass the media. Here, then, may lie the Internet‘s greatest potential for change. 
After widespread new media diffusion, the relations of politicians, audiences and the ‗old 
media‘ may not be quite the same as before.‖  (Blumler and Gurevitch 20011). 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
METHODOLOGY 
In preparing this commentary I was struck by Schudson‘s methodological observation which, 
in terms of my own reflections as a practitioner, has a particular acuity. On the one hand he 
talks about how: ―It is part of the scholar's job to blaze a usable trail through complexity‖ 
(Schudson 2008:3) and on the other, recognises his own (and other scholars‘) limitations 
when he describes his task as: 
―... to try to know the world of journalism not as journalists know it, but with what 
journalists know about it in mind and how journalists experience their work  and their  
world view. I try to picture how a question looks from the perspective of a reporter in the 
field or the editor in the newsroom‖ (Ibid: 8). 
 
I am fortunate to have no such limitation - I don't have to ―try and picture how a question 
looks from the perspective of a reporter‖ - I am, or at least have been, one. Hence, one of my 
main methodological approaches has been to utilise my own professional background to 
undertake either current or retrospective observational or experiential research. I have used 
this approach to investigate a number of issues including the coverage of international news 
(Gaber 1981, 1997 and 2001), the media management techniques of the political parties, 
(Gaber 2000, 2001, 2005a and 2007) the dynamics of election reporting (Gaber 2006, 2011 
and 2013c) and the culture and working practices of the Westminster lobby (Gaber 1992 and 
2013a). 
 
Observational research tends to be divided into one of three types – covert, overt and 
participatory.  All three have advantages and disadvantages. Covert research avoids the 
problem of the research subjects being affected by the process of observation but can raise 
ethical issues. Overt observation raises fewer ethical issues but does present problems of 
behaviour modification by the group being studied. Participant observation is closest to the 
procedure I am characterising as ‗concurrent experiential‘ and overcomes the difficulties 
identified above but is also not without its problems. Most notably, if one is both researching 
and at the same time engaged in professional journalistic practice, as is the case with a 
number of the studies being submitted, one does not necessarily have a holistic perspective. 
For example, my analysis of international news flows (Gaber 1981) was based on my 
experience of allocating news stories to broadcasters in Africa and Asia. However, at the time 
did not have a daily knowledge of the factors influencing either the selection of the stories to 
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be covered in the first place, nor how the stories I had selected for distribution were actually 
used at the end point. I had some acquaintance with the processes and could make what I took 
to be reasonable assumptions but, in the final analysis, I could not claim to have had either an 
overview, nor distance from the process.  In the case of the research involving a degree of 
retrospective reflexivity
xii
, not only are there the problems outlined above, but there is also 
the challenge of accurate recall and awareness of contemporary changes in professional 
journalistic practice. 
 
In addition to the experiential research method I have also used a number of other 
methodologies.  In seeking to analyse the influence of television on the select committee 
system (Gaber 1992) I used both survey and interview methodologies. Surveys can be highly 
problematic unless one has a clear idea of what one is seeking to achieve. In this instance the 
research was seeking to utilise a quantitative methodology but not one based on sampling. 
The 1992 research was based on two almost wholly reliable sampling frames (not always the 
case) namely, all the journalists listed on the website of the Parliamentary Press Gallery and 
all MPs listed on the Hansard website as members of select committees. All were sent email 
questionnaires which were followed up with three reminders. As a result, response rates of 30 
per cent and 53 per cent respectively were achieved. Since these tend to be groups that 
receive a plethora of survey requests these rates were regarded as sufficiently robust to form 
the basis of our generalisations. This assumption could be made because we were able to 
discover enough information about the non-respondents from the sampling frame to establish 
that they did not differ markedly from the respondents. Most survey methodologies involve 
some degree of sampling and the key issue, sometimes neglected, is the validity and 
usefulness of the original sampling frame, particularly the extent to which it enables a 
comparison to be drawn between respondents and non-respondents. A relatively low response 
rate, but one drawn from a robust and detailed sampling frame, with adequate information 
about non-respondents, enables one to make generalisations about the overall population 
being sampled with a degree of confidence. Surveys with higher rates of response, but drawn 
from unreliable sampling frames and with scant knowledge about non-respondents, provides 
a less reliable basis for generalisations. In this research journalists‘ gender, media outlets and 
length of time accredited to the Press Gallery could be established; for the MPs their gender, 
age, party affiliations, constituencies and their length of committee service could be 
established. 
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Focus group research is now ubiquitous, but frequently misunderstood. I have used it 
sparingly because it is a useful but limited methodology. In (Gaber 1996) I criticised those 
who saw focus groups as a viable alternative to a properly conducted poll: ―... there are no 
grounds for believing that a sample of half-a-dozen people meeting in a sitting room in 
Edgware is a more accurate reflection of the views of the British electorate than a properly 
drawn sample of one or two thousand from across the UK.‖, I wrote in a not-so-veiled 
criticism of the research methods adopted by Tony Blair‘s former polling adviser Phillip 
Gould (criticism I extended in one of the submitted items (Gaber 2005a)). 
 
 The other research method I have made significant use of is content analysis which I used 
when analysing media coverage of congestion charging (Gaber 2005b), changing television 
news agendas (Barnett et al 2000 and Barnett et al 2012) and coverage of the Israel/Palestine 
dispute (Gaber 2009). With content analysis the key issue is one of coding and how robust the 
coding frame proves to be. In my experience the only satisfactory way of establishing the 
utility and coherence of a frame is by undertaking pilot studies using double-blind coders. If 
one finds a high degree of agreement between coders – generally over 80% of the unit being 
coded – then one can be reasonably confident that the frame is reliable. Anything less means 
revisiting the frame and seeking to establish where the problematic areas lie (Cho 2008).  
 
In my content analysis work I found Entman's work on framing and priming particularly 
useful (Entman 1993). I used this approach in my analysis of the media coverage of the 
introduction of the London congestion charge (Gaber 2005b). I was able to demonstrate how 
the media framed their approach to the introduction in terms of ―Red Ken and the Loony 
Left‖ ride again. The use of this frame was particularly noticeable for the frequency of its use 
by the main right wing newspapers – the Sun, the Daily Mail and the Daily Telegraph. It was 
also much used by the London Evening Standard which spearheaded the unsuccessful 
campaign against the charge. 
 
However, I believe that the approach I developed – combining framing with a film studies 
approach – which I used to analyse television news coverage of the Israel/Hezbollah War in 
2006 was innovative and worthy of further utilisation . I was seeking to overcome some of 
the inadequacies of the basic framing approach – namely that frames are rarely 'exclusive' in 
that there is often a degree of overlap between them, hence questions can arise as to how 
defined the frame might appear to the audience. The second inadequacy to be overcome is 
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that the framing approach can mar the overall perspective, in other words it can focus the 
researcher‘s attention too greatly on particular frames, so that he or she can miss the wood for 
the trees. Hence, I argued that a framing approach was necessary, but not sufficient, when 
evaluating allegations of bias. I wrote at the time: 
 ―A news frame can appear to be, and can indeed be, neutral. For example, a story about 
efforts to achieve a ceasefire at the UN might tell us very little about from whose 
perspective the story was being framed.‖ (Gaber 2011). 
 
 I did this by combining a framing analysis with the film studies notion of 'authorship' which, 
by decoding the words and pictures, seeks to reveal who audiences would perceive to be the 
'dominant voice‘ of a particular scene or sequence. The technique seeks to answer the 
question, at any particular point in the narrative, whose point of view (POV) is the auteur 
invoking, and how is it being perceived by the audience? If one asked the news broadcasters 
the first question – whose voice were they invoking - they would undoubtedly deny that they 
were invoking any ‗voice‘ other than their own, and would, in turn stress that their sole 
preoccupation was their statutory obligations of impartiality and balance. However, if one 
asked the audience a similar question one would well might hear a different response.  
 
Without the resources to undertake any quantitative audience research I had to develop a 
methodology that would provide a, more or less, objective measurement of the likely 
assignation of POV that an audience would perceive to be dominant in any particular news 
report. Using two researchers, and working on the basis of double-blind coding, it was 
possible to establish that, for the most part, identifying a dominant POV for each item was 
not hugely problematic. We found that there was no disagreement between the coders about 
establishing a POV for around 80% of the material analysed. That left 20% which, rather than 
seek to negotiate, was coded as ‗no discernible POV‘ and was thus not included in the overall 
POV totals. In this way I was content that I had discovered a means of analysing the coverage 
that provided both qualitative and quantitative insights that was robust but also gave tone and 
texture to the analysis. 
 
In this research I also made use of comparative methodology. I was originally asked to 
evaluate the BBC‘s coverage of the Israel/Hezbollah war against the BBC‘s own editorial 
guidelines as a measure of bias (Gaber 2009). I did not believe that this was sufficient for the 
purpose since it implied that if the BBC‘s coverage was in line with its own guidelines then, 
ipso facto, it was unbiased. I chose a different approach involving both a content analysis, 
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outlined above, and a comparison with coverage on ITV.  This latter methodology, of course, 
did not directly address the bias issue but it did provide a benchmark to measure BBC‘s 
coverage against. I believed that whether I found the BBC‘s coverage to be biased or not, 
without the ability to say that either a similar judgement could, or could not, be made against 
ITV News, was an important calibration to make. In the event, because of the comparative 
method, I was able to conclude, with some confidence, that the BBC‘s coverage of the 
conflict was, if anything, fairer (to both sides) than the coverage on ITV News (Gaber 2009).  
 
I also made use of the comparative method when investigating the working practices of 
political journalists, both during election campaigns and at Westminster (Gaber 2011 and 
2013a).  For the ongoing Political Communications book series (published after every 
General Election) I was asked to look at how the experience of reporting elections had 
changed over time; for this I compared the working day of the political reporter in 2010 with 
his counterpart the last time Labour was ejected from office in 1979. This historical 
comparison demonstrated just how dramatic these changes had been, both in terms of the 
information available to reporters and the number of media platforms they were expected to 
service (Gaber 2011). In looking at the impact of the MPs‘ expenses scandal on the 
Westminster lobby, rather than simply observing and making assumptions about the 
contemporary lobby, I compared its functioning and membership with how it was 
documented by two distinguished scholars forty years ago  ( see Seymour-Ure 1968,  Tunstall 
1970). This gave me a quasi-longitudinal perspective which enabled me to draw out vital 
differences between the lobby then and now. Through this approach I was able to make, what 
I believe to be the key finding: that it was the reduction in the number of regional political 
correspondents at Westminster which was one of the main explanatory factors as to why MPs‘ 
abuse of their expenses was not so readily apparent to the members of the lobby in 2009. 
(Gaber 2013a).  
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
COMMENTARY ON THE FOLLOWING SUBMITTED ITEMS 
 
1. NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL NEWS AGENDAS 
'The Media and the Third World' (1981) Multiracial Education (1981) 
  
‗The View from the Newsrooms of the UK and the International Agencies‘ in 
Environmentalism and the Mass Media: the North South Divide Chapman G. Fraser C. Gaber 
I and Kumar, K, (1997). 
 
2. PARLIAMENT, POLITICIANS AND THE MEDIA 
‗Committees on Camera: MPs and Lobby Views on the Effects of Televising Commons 
Select Committees‘ in Parliamentary Affairs (1992)  
 
‗Government by spin: an analysis of the process‘ in Media Culture and Society (2000) 
 
Westminster Tales: the 21
st
 Century Crisis in Political Journalism, (with Barnett S.) (2001) 
Chapter 8 Controlling the Whitehall machine 
Chapter 9 The Changing Reporting Culture 
 
‗Too much of a good thing: the ‗problem‘ of political communications in a mass media 
democracy‘ in the Journal of Public Affairs (2007) 
 
‗The Lobby in transition: what the 2009 MPs expenses scandal revealed about the changing 
relationship between politicians and the Westminster lobby‘ Media History (2013)  
 
‗Rupert and the Three Card Trope – What You See Ain't Necessarily What You Get‘ Media 
Culture and Society (2012) 
 
‗Two and a Half Cheers for Leveson‘ in After Leveson: the Future of British Journalism (eds. 
Keble and Mair) (2013) 
 
 
3. ELECTION COVERAGE 
‗Dislocated and Distracted: Media, Parties and the Voters in the 2005 General Election 
Campaign‘ British Politics (2006) 
 
‗The Hollowed-out Election; or where did all the policy go‘ (2013) Journal of Political 
Marketing (2013)  
 
‗The Transformation of Campaign Reporting: the 2010 UK General Election, Revolution or 
Evolution?‘ in Political Communication in Britain: The Leader debates, the Campaign and 
the Media in the 2010 General Election‘ Wring D. et al (eds.) (2011)  
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4. BIAS AND REPRESENTATION 
Culture Wars: the media and the British Left with Curran J. and Petley J Edinburgh, 
Edinburgh University Press (2005)  
Chapter 7 ‗Slaying the Dragon‘  
Chapter 8 ‗Driven to Distraction’ 
 
‗Is the BBC Biased: the Corporation and the Coverage of the 2006 Israeli-Hezbollah War‘ 
(2009) in Journalism, Theory, Practice and Criticism (2009) 
 
‗Three cheers for subjectivity: or the crumbling of the seven pillars of traditional journalistic 
wisdom‘ in The End of Journalism? Charles A and Stewart G. eds. Peter Lang (2010) 
 
 
(In the commentary that follows I have sought to highlight what I believe to be the key 
findings and insights of the submitted work. I have sought to organise the submissions along 
the following five broad thematic lines: National and International News Agendas, 
Parliament, Politicians and the Media, Changing Coverage of Elections and Issues of Bias 
and Representation.) 
 
National and International News Agendas 
1. 'The Media and the Third World' (1981) Multiracial Education (1981) 
  
2. ―The View from the Newsrooms of the UK and the International Agencies‖ in 
Environmentalism and the Mass Media: the North South Divide Chapman G. Fraser C. 
Gaber I and Kumar, K, (1997) 
 
My journalistic career began in the field of international news and hence, almost inevitably, 
this was the first area in which I developed a scholarly interest. The two articles submitted 
here – the imbalance in news resources between the ‗first‘ and the ‗third‘ world and the 
growing problem of the degradation of the earth‘s environment, had (and still have) strong 
normative overtones which  formed part of my motivation in researching and writing about 
such subjects and is reflected in the work submitted. 
 
The first item – published in 1981 - now appears to me to be somewhat prescient. Long 
before I was familiar with either the notion of a ‗crisis in public communications‘ or the ideas 
that were later to form the core of Habermas (1989) and Castells (2008) writings, and even 
before the publication of the controversial McBride report for UNESCO  (McBride 1980)
xiii
, I 
was already grappling with the problems arising from the globalisation of news. This article 
represents an articulation of my concerns about the imbalances in international news flows 
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that I perceived were distorting the global public sphere. My concerns had come into sharp 
focus when working as a desk editor  for Visnews (later to become Reuters TV) in London – 
where part of my role was deciding what international  news coverage should be sent to TV 
stations in Africa and Asia. This article - 'The Media and the Third World' - published in 
Multiracial Education (1981) was written at a time when there was some expectation that the 
work on international news flows, then being undertaken by UNESCO, might develop into 
positive steps in terms of ameliorating the distortions in news resources between the North 
and the South. The article represented the start of my concerns about news agenda setting and 
representation, although at the time I was unaware of the academic debates surrounding these 
issues.  My methodological approach was almost entirely experiential reflexivity. 
 
The article begins by identifying the crucial role played by the international news agencies – 
an area only then recently opened up to scholarship (Tunstall 1977 and Boyd-Barrett 1980). 
Second, it linked to debates about the imbalance in the flow of news between the North and 
the South (McBride 1980).  Third, it articulated the problem of how Africa was being 
represented in the wider world - something that has been much written about in the 
intervening years but was then a new topic for discussion, as the special issue of Multiracial 
Education represents. And I had no awareness of notions of the ‗manufacture of news‘ then 
being developed by the Birmingham School (Cohen and Young 1981, Cohen 1972) when I 
wrote, 
― .. the bulk of the news ―extracted" from the Third World has been originated, processed 
and distributed by Western based organisations with their own Western perspectives on 
what is, and what is not, important.‖ (Gaber 1981: 104). 
 
Equally I had no formal knowledge of the concepts of either agenda-setting (McCombs 2004) 
or representation (Hall 1978) when I observed how, in the main, the Western media tended to 
convey negative images about Africa: 
―... news is focused on dramatic and extreme events. Famines, floods, earthquakes and so 
on all ‗good copy‘ that is consonant with the developed world‘s view of what the Third 
World is all about.  For these stories, particularly where television coverage is obtainable, 
show the third world as backward, helpless and almost totally dependent on beneficent 
Western aid.‖ (Gaber 1981: 106). 
 
Based on my own knowledge I constructed an imaginary narrative about how. as a result of 
the competition between the international agencies, a news report from Tanzania could 
become transformed from a speech about agriculture to a potential casus belli.  From this I 
theorised, in a way that pre-dated Entman‘s seminal article (1993), and equally unaware of 
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Goffman‘s work (1994) which established framing as a central concept within media and 
communications scholarship:  
―It (the narrative) demonstrates how events in the Third World country are often forced 
into a framework constructed by journalists working in the West – and it's because of this 
framework that only a limited number of Third World stories are ever categorised as 
‗news‖ (Gaber 1981: 106). 
 
 I concluded by suggesting that simply handing control of the flow of international news from 
the media elites, who ran the international agencies, to the governing elites in newly 
independent countries - as was then being mooted - would not necessarily result in 
improvements in either representations of the South in the developed world, nor a more 
balanced flow of news from the North – a warning that the passage of time has fully justified. 
As McBride said: 
 ―Today, virtually no one disputes the reality of this imbalance. There is no general 
agreement, however, about concrete applications of the concept, still less about remedies 
to the problem and desirable policies.‖  (McBride: 28). 
 
As a result of my interest in global news flows, contrasting national and international news 
agendas and the differences in representation between developed and less developed 
countries, I was invited to join an ESRC-funded project
xiv
 which sought to investigate how 
the notion of the 'environment' was differently perceived, and represented, in developed and 
developing countries – with the UK and India as the case studies. This resulted in a co-
authored book Environmentalism and the Mass Media: the North South Divide (Chapman et 
al 1997).   
 
In terms of my own contribution, I focussed on seeking to understand how and why the 
global public sphere was failing to address the issue of climate change. Media representations 
of both the issue, and its potential solutions, varied widely between countries of the North 
and South – as Gurevitch, Levy and Roeh put it: ―The Global Newsroom is still confronted 
by a Tower of Babel‖ (1991: 215). And although this book was published more than 15 years 
ago the problems it identified remain at the heart of the global debate around the 
environment, particularly as the Chinese and Indian economies have continued to expand 
which in turn has increased the threat to the planet‘s sustainability.  
 
From my own perspective my work on this project enabled me to dovetail my interest in the 
global news agenda with a more domestic focus on the prominence, and lack of it, that the 
environment as a news category attracted. My main contribution to the book was a 
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production study entailing both newsroom observation and interviews with more than 30 
environmental reporters, editors and news editors. These included journalists working for the 
major UK print and broadcast outlets, and also those working for Reuters, CNN in Atlanta, 
Associated Press in New York and the Asian Broadcasting Union in Kuala Lumpur. The aim 
was to try and establish how, and why, certain news stories about the environment gained 
media prominence whilst other, equally significant, stories did not. In other words, I was 
hoping to shed light on one of the key issues within the agenda setting debate – whose agenda 
leads -  the media‘s, the politicians‘, the NGOs‘ or the public‘s?  This very much related to 
the debate about primary definers (Hall 1978) and Hall‘s critics who accepted the broad-
brush notion he advanced but argued that the role of primary definers was far more contested 
than Hall had allowed for (Schlesinger and Tumber 1994). 
 
In addition to informing this debate, the chapter gave insights into newsroom practices that I 
was able to contribute as a result of my insider‘s knowledge and experience. I used this 
knowledge to look at agenda-setting debates not, as many studies had done, through the prism 
of media/source relations or the media/public nexus, but by looking at the relationships 
between environmental reporters and their news editors, These relationships, I found, to be 
informed by both sides‘ perceptions of their imagined audiences, a not dissimilar approach to 
that adopted by Gans in his study of gatekeepers (Gans 1979). 
 
I began by outlining the mechanics of a typical newsroom, highlighting the crucial role 
played by competition; that is competition not just between media outlets, but also between 
reporters within the same news organisation. Through these interviews it became clear that 
the environment, as a news category, had a marginality compared to more traditional news 
categories. I suggested that this was because it was a relatively new subject area and, as a 
result, did not have many ‗champions‘ at senior levels within the editorial process. Indeed, it 
was often perceived as a slightly quirky topic, perhaps of interest only to a very specialised 
audience. Hence, running such stories ran the risk of being seen as ‗campaigning‘ – a word 
with strong negative connotations for many mainstream journalists. I broached the issue of 
impartiality by asking my respondents about the degree to which they saw themselves as both 
journalists and environmental campaigners. The vast majority firmly rejected the notion that 
they were anything but impartial observers – ―We do not crusade ...we‘re not joining 
anyone‘s movement‖ (Gaber 1997: 38) one told me.  
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In discussing how a newsroom‘s notion of news agendas developed I highlighted the crucial 
role played by the news editor (the City Editor in Gans‘ 1979 study) as the key gatekeeper, 
and how the agenda-building process developed through the ongoing tensions between the 
reporters and news editors, another characteristic identified by Gans. ―News desks can‘t see 
further than the end of their noses‖ (Gaber 1997: 38) the Guardian’s environmental reporter 
told me. In investigating how the reporters themselves made decisions about which stories 
they thought worth pursuing, I encountered some classic definitions of news. The Daily 
Telegraph’s foreign editor talked about the importance of there being ―identifiable goodies 
and baddies...an element of conflict... [and] transparency, readers have to be able to get to 
grips with the story.‖ (Ibid:  40). Tension and conflict was identified by many respondents 
and, unsurprisingly, those working in television stressed the importance of ―stunning 
pictures‖ (Ibid: 41). Though this also linked to an important inhibitor of environmental 
coverage - the prohibitive costs associated with covering climate change-related events in 
remote locations. 
 
A central part of my analysis – and this partly influenced my future scholarly trajectory – was 
an investigation into the relationship between the media‘s, and the politicians‘, news agendas. 
The conventional popular wisdom – then and now – is that in this duality the media play the 
decisive role. The Sun‘s famous, or infamous, headline after the Conservatives‘ surprise 
election victory in 1992 summed this up when it boasted ―It‘s the Sun Wot Won It‖. Twenty 
years on a similar view was heard from Tony Blair in the previously cited speech when he 
talked about how politicians were now ―profoundly accountable, daily, through the media‖ 
(Blair 2007). Whilst there is widespread acceptance of the notion developed by the agenda-
setting theorists, that the media ―don‘t tell us what to think but they do tell us what to think 
about‖ (Ruddock 2007: 41), I would suggest that the situation is more nuanced than this 
quotation suggests. First, because the power, if it does exist, to ―tell us what to think about‖ 
ultimately leads to the power to ―tell us what to think‖. If, for example, the press campaigns 
relentlessly about the difficulties presented by surges in immigration, it can be of little 
surprise if public opinion begins to perceive immigration as a problem that needs tackling, 
presumably by limiting numbers coming into the country.  
 
Second, that over time there are identifiable shifts in the balance of power and influence 
between the media and the political class which can, and do, result in the direction of 
influence shifting; this depends on a range of contextual and substantive factors. In this 
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particular research I was able to demonstrate that, as far as coverage of environmental issues 
in the late eighties was concerned, there was a measurable movement, in terms of issue 
saliency, that went from the political arena to the media; although that is not to say that this 
direction of flow is immutable and generalisable for all times and in all circumstances. 
 
In the chapter I identified a speech made by the Prime Minister of the day, Margaret Thatcher, 
in September 1988, as a crucial moment in establishing the saliency of the environment as a 
news category. Her speech subsequently became characterised as the moment when she cast 
off her mantle as ‗the iron lady‘ to become ‗the green goddess‘ (Gaber 1997: 43) - declaring 
herself a convert to environmentalism. Correspondents recalled this event as a transformative 
moment; but the reality was that at the time it was barely reported. In her memoirs Mrs 
Thatcher‘s recalled that there was so little interest in a speech on the environment that not a 
single television crew turned up to record it; indeed, the absence of TV lights forced her to 
read the speech with the aid of a candelabra and made her reluctantly don her rarely publicly- 
seen spectacles (Thatcher 1993: 43). 
 
The environmental journalists I interviewed accepted that, following the speech, their 
numbers increased but they were reluctant to concede that their organisations‘ news priorities 
could be influenced by a political intervention. They attributed the increase in environmental 
correspondents, not to Mrs Thatcher‘s speech, but to two environmental stories that preceded 
it – one involving a ‗plague‘ that affected North Sea seals (a visual story which was not too 
expensive to cover) and the refusal of UK port authorities to allow a foreign ship to dock that 
was carrying toxic waste (again cheap, local and visual). In fact these stories happened 
several weeks before Mrs Thatcher‘s speech, and whilst these events might have influenced 
Mrs Thatcher, it was the speech itself and the coverage that followed it, that appeared to have 
made the environment a major subject of public discussion.  
 
Prior to the speech there had been just two specialist environmental correspondents working 
in the national media, in the months after this figure climbed to 12. And the environment 
remained an important news category throughout the following year until the Green Party 
achieved a surprising 15% of the popular vote in the 1989 European Elections; this caused 
Mrs Thatcher to do an about-turn and seek to put the green genie back in the political bottle. 
The impact on the environmental reporting lobby was dramatic – within a few months their 
numbers in the national media had shrunk back to four.  
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Parliament, Politicians and the Media 
1. ―Committees on Camera: MPs and Lobby Views on the Effects of Televising 
Commons Select Committees‖ in Parliamentary Affairs (1992)  
 
2. ―Government by spin: an analysis of the process‖ in Media Culture & Society (2000) 
 
3. Westminster Tales: the 21st Century Crisis in Political Journalism, (with Barnett S.) 
(2001) 
Chapter 8 Controlling the Whitehall machine 
Chapter 9 The Changing Reporting Culture 
 
4. ‗Too much of a good thing: the ‗problem‘ of political communications in a mass 
media democracy‘ in the Journal of Public Affairs (2007) 
 
5. ―The Lobby in transition: what the 2009 MPs expenses scandal revealed about the 
changing relationship between politicians and the Westminster lobby‖ Media History (2013)  
 
6. ―Rupert and the Three Card Trope – What You See Ain't Necessarily What You Get‖ 
Media Culture and Society (2012) 
 
7. ―Two and a Half Cheers for Leveson‖ in After Leveson: the Future of British 
Journalism (eds. Keble and Mair) (2013) 
 
As discussed above, the focus of my research into the coverage of environmental news was 
on the agenda-setting power of politicians; this was probably not unconnected with the fact 
that, following my time spent as an international journalist, I then moved into the political 
arena. In 1989 I guided the independent production company I had helped establish (Seven 
Day Productions) in its successful bid to win the first-ever franchise to televise the 
committees of the Houses of Commons and Lords. It was whilst overseeing this operation 
that I observed how, despite politicians' and journalists' protestations to the contrary, the 
television cameras appeared to be having a significant impact on the standing and influence 
of the House of Commons‘ select committees. Hence, with a colleague (Steven Barnett), I 
conducted research among both MPs and journalists, which resulted in the publication of 
―Committees on Camera: MPs and Lobby Views on the Effects of Televising Commons 
Select Committees‖ in Parliamentary Affairs. This looked at how the televising had affected 
the behaviour and attitudes both of members of the committees and of the journalists 
covering them at Westminster. 
 
The research involved postal surveys of all MPs who were members of select committees and 
all members of the Parliamentary Press Gallery. The response rates from these two groups –
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53% and 30% respectively – were highly satisfactory, given that political journalists and MPs 
are notoriously resistant to being ‗researched‘. This quantitative material was supplemented 
by in-depth interviews with both press and broadcasting journalists and editorial executives. 
Previous research (Hetherington et al 1990 and Franklin 1992) had identified that, following 
the start of the televising of Parliament in 1989, there had been an increase in media coverage 
of its deliberations. But neither piece of research attempted any sort of evaluation of the 
impact this increased coverage might be having on perceptions of political power and 
influence. As we wrote at the time:  
―Even conceptually, it is difficult to disentangle the complex interrelationships which 
eventually determine whether television has an impact. Our aim in this article is 
simply to offer evidence which may inform a continuing debate.‖ (Barnett and 
Gaber: 1992: 411). 
 
Based on the survey responses received, we concluded that the impact of television on 
the select committees had been to significantly increase their political influence – if not 
their actual constitutional power. We adduced three main ways in which this influence 
had increased. First, through the educational impact of the televising i.e. the public, the 
press and others were gaining a better understanding of the role of the committees (these 
were a relatively new innovation having been introduced, in their current form, only in 
1979). Second, television was making the committees more effective. This was because 
ministers and other witnesses, aware of being televised, now prepared themselves more 
thoroughly for the grilling and this made the committees‘ deliberations that much more 
informed. The third impact we termed ‗accountability‘, as one MP told us: ―The 
televising of select committees is the most effective aspect of the televising of 
Parliament. There is nowhere to hide and this seems to me to be genuine public 
accountability.‖ (Ibid: 413).  
 
One other of our research findings, which links to my earlier argument about the 
strategic importance of the news desk as the main gatekeeper, was that whilst broadcast 
journalists were more positive about the impact the televising was having on their own 
output, print journalists reported that this was only the case when they found themselves 
asked to follow up committee stories that they had originally chosen to ignore but had 
been seen by their newsdesks on television. As we wrote at the time  
―Their [the committees‘] coverage on TV raises their profile with newsrooms and with 
senior executives who spend much of their time watching TV and get interested in 
what they see.' (Ibid: 417)  
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But despite concluding that television had significantly increased the influence of the 
committees in the ways elaborated above, we also concluded that it had not resulted in 
the enhanced role originally mapped out for them by the reformers of the 1970s – that 
of giving Parliament a greater measure of control over the executive. Our conclusion 
was that as the committees came to recognise that their role was one of influence rather 
than power then television coverage:  
―... [would act] as a catalyst to transform the nature and role of select committees from 
a monitoring system to a system of influence through accountability, efficiency and 
education. It may be that constitutionally there is little in common with the American 
model of congressional committees. But the publicity effects will not be dissimilar. 
And it may not be long before real power will finally accrue via the lever of 
television's publicity. (Ibid: 419).  
 
In the light of the enhanced public profile now regularly achieved by select committees 
investigating high salience issues - such as the role of the banks in the financial crisis, 
corporate tax avoidance and the phone hacking affair - it would be appropriate to observe 
that our predictions of 1993 have been very substantially fulfilled. 
 
Whilst committees were of increasing importance in Parliament, it was the growing impact of 
'spin' that most captured my concern whilst I was working at Westminster as a television and 
radio journalist. An article I wrote for Media, Culture and Society (Gaber 2000) reflected 
both my scholarly interests but also what I had observed, at first hand - namely the 
transformation in political/media relations between the years of John Major‘s Government 
and the election of New Labour. It was a transformation that moved from Conservative 
lassitude to the robust, bordering on aggressive, stance of the incoming Blair administration. 
The insights that I gained from this experience prompted me to seek to deconstruct these 
changes, and also to express my concern about the impact these changes were having on the 
practice of political journalism and their potentially negative impact on the political public 
sphere. My concern was stimulated, not just by my experience as a practitioner, but by the 
pronouncements of Tony Blair‘s then press secretary, Alastair Campbell. These were 
crystallised by a comment, which to some might have appeared innocuous, that he made to a 
Commons‘ committee investigating government public relations: 
―In opposition we made clear that communications was not something that you tagged on 
the end, it is part of what you do. That is something that we have tried to bring into 
government.‖ (Select Committee on Public Administration 1999: 507). 
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I was apprehensive that this emphasis on communications – which in shorthand came to be 
referred to as spin - was having a distorting effect on the entire political process, a fear that 
was also reflected by the Committee Chair, Tony Wright, a former Political Science 
academic, whom I quoted thus:  
―They [politicians] like to be thought well of and want to control the message and the 
messengers as far as possible. There is nothing new or even disreputable about this [spin]: 
it comes with the job. What is new though is the systematic and professional way in which 
it is now undertaken..... The practitioners of these black arts are increasingly the key 
figures in the political world.‖ (Wright, 1999: 20). 
 
As part of my commitment to using my professional experience to assist in the scholarly 
analysis of media/politics relations I sought to de-construct the techniques of spin by 
breaking them down, using the marketing terms of ‗above‘ and ‗below the line‘.  'Above the 
line' activities I defined as ―those, more or less overt initiatives, that in very simple terms, 
would have caused an 'old fashioned' press officer no great difficulty.‖ (Gaber 2000: 
508); and 'below the line‘ as ― those now more associated with the term 'spin doctor' - 
usually covert and as much about strategy and tactics as about the imparting of 
information‖ (Ibid). 
 
Under the category of ‗above the line‘ I included: publicising government/party 
announcements and speeches, reacting to such announcements and speeches, publicising 
interviews and articles and reacting to such and reacting to external events. My ‗below the 
line‘ classification included: staying on message, spinning, ―re- and pre-buttal‖, setting  and 
driving the news agenda, planting a story, building-up and undermining a personality, pre-
empting, kite-flying, raising or lowering expectations and bullying and intimidation. I also 
included some more esoteric categories. These included: ‗milking a story‘ – keeping a 
particular issue as high up the news agenda, for as long as possible, by finding new angles; 
‗fire-breaking‘ – ―a deliberately constructed diversion to take journalists off the scent of an 
embarrassing story that seems, in the journalistic parlance, to have developed 'legs'.‖ (Ibid: 
512); ‗stoking the fire' - ―... the mirror image of 'fire-breaking' - finding material to keep an 
opponent's awkward story running (Ibid: 513); ‗throwing out the bodies‘ which involved 
taking advantage of a major news event to publish, hopefully unnoticed, bad news stories (Jo 
Moore provided a vivid example of this technique - shortly after this article was published 
she sent her now infamous email ‗good day to bury bad news‘ on the 11th September 2001); 
and its mirror image, ‗ laundering‘ when, in order to camouflage an item of bad news, and in 
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the absence of  a substantive positive news story, a minor item of ‗good news‘ is released 
with the hope that the timing  and presentation will relegate the bad news to the inside pages; 
and finally the 'white commonwealth‘ – a term first attributed to Harold Wilson‘s Press 
Secretary, Joe Haines (Cockerell et al 1984) which  was ―the name given to the creation of a 
favoured group of correspondents who received special treatment and access, above and 
beyond that available to other political correspondents.‖ (Gaber 2000: 516). 
  
The article ended with my speculation about an often debated subject ―the end of spin?‖  I 
noted that in 1999 the Labour Government ran into a series of internal spats that led to the 
resignations of two of their chief spinners, Peter Mandelson (who was close to Tony Blair) 
and Charlie Whelan (Gordon Brown‘s spin doctor). Much was written at the time about this 
being perhaps ―the end of 'government by spin' and the return to a more traditional, policy-
based political discourse.‖ (Ibid: 517). Yet even as Blair and his colleagues were launching a 
series of new policy initiatives, designed to focus discussion on policy rather than, the 
recently resigned Head of Information at the Department of Health, Romola Christopherson, 
was writing that Labour would find it impossible to wean itself off spin, to which, she said, it 
had become addicted. I concluded my article by saying, ―Ms Christopherson's diagnosis of 
new Labour's addiction is unambiguous; whether or not it is prescient remains to be seen.‖ 
(Ibid). 
 
In the contemporary discussions around the ‗crisis‘, two books struck me as highly pertinent 
– Franklin‘s Packaging Politics (1994) which presented an overview of the development of 
the marketisation of politics and Blumler and Gurevitch‘s The Crisis of Public 
Communication (1995). Both books raised concerns about the current state, and future 
trajectory, of political communications. I shared these concerns and this led me into my co-
authoring Westminster Tales: the 21st century crisis in political journalism, with Steve 
Barnett. This much quoted volume argued, as its sub-title suggested, that as a result of the 
growth of spin and its associated culture there was a real danger that political journalists were 
being impeded from carrying out their work effectively, with concomitant implications for the 
quality of political discourse and the democratic process.  
 
The jointly written introduction to the book (not submitted here) sets out our argument that 
―the vital function of independent and critical political reporting is being progressively 
undermined to the ultimate benefit of those in power.‖ (Barnett and Gaber 2001: 1). Our 
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thesis was that this was ―leading inexorably towards a more conformist, less critical reporting 
environment which is increasingly likely to prove supportive of incumbent 
governments.‖(Ibid: 2) and we feared that journalists were facing ―an increasing loss of 
independence.‖  And,  
―In the classic sociological dichotomy of structure versus agency, we believe the 
pendulum has moved (and is still moving) away from the model of journalists as free 
professional agents towards a model of journalists increasingly beset and hemmed in by an 
array of different structural demands.‖ (Ibid). 
 
We identified four separate, but interlocking, structural pressures which we argued were 
responsible for this undermining. These were first, changes in the relationship between 
political journalists and formal political sources as the latter increased their power  - an 
affirmation of Hall‘s notion of primary definers (Hall et al 1978)  and a reinforcement of  
Schlesinger and Tumber‘s observation that primary definers are not predetermined but learn 
to be successful "political entrepreneurs" (Schlesinger and Tumber 1990). Second, that the 
impact of media ownership, i.e. the willingness of owners to involve themselves more 
directly in the political stance of their newspapers (utilising Tunstall‘s (1996) distinction 
between the old press lord and the new media mogul). Third, the unprecedented growth in 
media outlets, and the impact of this increased competition on the practice of political 
reporting (which we suggested has led to ‗tabloididsation‘ – shorthand for changes in the 
style and  content of political coverage which we argued had contributed to the further 
impoverishment of the public sphere). The final factor we identified was the changing nature 
of the journalism profession which covered changes in how it was managed, its training 
methods, its uses of new technology and its employment conditions (Barnet and Gaber 2001: 
5-8). 
 
In the two chapters submitted here (for which I was solely responsible) I developed one of the 
key themes of the monograph, namely that the balance of power, between politicians and the 
media at Westminster was being transformed in favour of the politicians.  I argued that this 
transformation had come about for two main reasons. First, because of the electoral success 
of a Labour Party that had made communications a core political function - and this included 
seeking to gain maximum control over how the media reported politics. The second factor 
was the proliferation of outlets for political news as a result of the rise of 24-hour news-based 
television and radio channels, expanded print paginations and the start of online news 
coverage. These trends had dramatically shifted the balance of power in favour of politicians, 
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as the competition for news, gossip and interviews created a sellers‘ market, putting more 
power in the hands of the politicians and their media advisers, as they were able to distribute 
their ‗favours‘ (i.e. interviews) to those outlets that they deemed would provide them with the 
most favourable coverage (Gaber 2001: 99/100). 
 
I sought to analyse the impact these changes were having on the political reporting culture. 
Based on my personal experience, and on interviews with members of the Lobby, I 
demonstrated how reporting at Westminster had become ―industrialised – more stories, being 
produced for more outlets at ever-greater speed.‖ (Ibid: 125). And, as part of my commitment 
to using my professional knowledge to throw light on media processes, I outlined how the 
average political reporter‘s day had changed as a result of this ‗industrialisation‘. I argued 
that the most dramatic way that this changed reporting environment manifested itself  was in 
the absence of political reporters from their three traditional Westminster ‗hunting grounds‘ - 
the Press Gallery, the House of Commons Lobby and the Downing Street briefings. I 
analysed why this had come about and what impact it was having on the reporting of politics 
and I suggested a number of explanations for these trends. The two key ones were the 
growing desire, and ability, of government and political parties to try and drive the news 
agenda themselves and the increase in media competitiveness that was impinging on political 
journalists (as it was on journalists across the board) - a transformation being brought about 
largely, but not exclusively, by changes in the patterns of media ownership and regulation 
introduced in the 1980s. I also suggested that the then new phenomena of devolution, and the 
growth of the internet, were likely to have a profound impact on how politics would be 
reported at Westminster in the future. In retrospect I would suggest that, in terms of the latter 
this was very much the case; with regard to the former, very much less so. 
 
My research output in this period did not just involve in using empirical data and personal 
observation to analyse specific issues. I was also writing about the broader ethical and 
professional dilemmas that confronted journalists as a result of the changes in the 
media/politics nexus described above. ―Too much of a good thing: the ‗problem‘ of political 
communications in a mass media democracy‖ published in the Political Quarterly, was a 
reflection on what I termed the democratic conundrum – that the greater emphasis placed on 
communication by politicians, far from leading to greater trust as some argued (Norris 2000, 
McNair 2003), seemed to be having the reverse effect. My starting point was the report of the 
‗Power Inquiry‘xv, a major Rowntree-funded project established in 2004 at a time when there 
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was growing concern about the current, and future, trajectory of the British political system. 
The Inquiry, which made 30 recommendations designed, to "save British democracy from 
meltdown" argued:  
―There is now a well-ingrained popular view across the country that our political 
institutions and their politicians are failing, untrustworthy, and disconnected from the great 
mass of the British people. This last point cannot be stressed too strongly. We have been 
struck by just how wide and deep is the contempt felt for formal politics in Britain.‖ 
(Power 2006: 220). 
 
With this as a starting point I sought to reflect on the extent to which the political 
communications system might, in part at least, be responsible for this ―well-ingrained popular 
view‖. I suggested that one of the fundamental problems faced by modern democracies 
derived from the notion of 'informed consent':  
―...democratic systems require that, in the interests of transparency, and ultimately, 
accountability, citizens should be kept as fully informed as possible by governments.‖ 
(Ibid:  219).  
 
From this I constructed a thesis along the following lines: that in order to achieve this 
'informed consent' – and because of concomitant media pressures – governments were under 
relentless pressure to 'communicate' in order to demonstrate real or perceived transparency. 
Hence, politicians in democracies were always looking to generate publicity, but at the same 
time they carried what I characterised as a 'selfish gene' (pace Dawkins 1989) that ensured 
that, irrespective of their immediate concerns, all their actions and pronouncements were 
underpinned by a calculation (whether consciously or otherwise) as to the likely effect on 
their own, and their party's, prospects of survival and reproduction (Price 2005, Campbell 
2010 and 2011). 
 
Thus, I argued that all political communications had both an overt and covert purpose. The 
overt one was simply the message itself – I gave examples of such in the article - but covertly 
(whether or not this has been consciously thought through), politicians and advisers were 
always calculating as to what their message might betoken in terms of their political standing. 
Thus, of necessity, they framed their messages in whatever way put the politician, or their 
party, in the best possible light – in other words 'spin'. Thus the public received messages that 
were not necessarily all that they might appear i.e. upbeat about themselves and downbeat 
about any opposition. And almost inevitably this meant that when the promised Nirvana, or 
threatened Armageddon, did not eventuate, the public's distrust of politicians was not just 
confirmed but amplified - hence the politician‘s lament, ―the more we communicate the less 
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we are trusted‖. However, the article concluded on a more positive note suggesting that rather 
than simply accepting this as a counsel of despair it might be feasible to introduce regulatory 
measures that would provide some sort of policing of the government's communications and 
information function that might ameliorate the worst aspects of the problem (although the 
proposal I outlined to give the Press Complaints Commission greater powers in this area has 
now been overtaken by the Leveson Inquiry and subsequent events). 
 
My continuing interest in journalism ethics, particularly in the context of relations between 
the media and politicians, led me to write a number of articles in the wake of the eruption of 
two major contemporary scandals in this area - the revelations about MPs‘ expenses in 2009 
and the phone-hacking and the subsequent Leveson Inquiry of 2011/12. The MPs‘ expenses 
scandal took me back to some of the issues I had discussed in Westminster Tales which 
related to the changes that were then taking place in how political journalists practised their 
trade at Westminster.  In ‗The Lobby in Transition: What the 2009 MPs‘ expenses scandal 
revealed about the changing relationship between politicians and the Westminster Lobby‘ 
published in Media History, I argued that one fall-out from the scandal was the damage it had 
done to the reputation and efficacy of the Westminster lobby. This was, in part, because the 
expenses story itself had not originated in the lobby. I argued that this failure symbolised the 
extent to which journalists at Westminster had become too close to the politicians they were 
supposed to be monitoring and too far from the public whom they were supposed to be 
serving.  I used a comparative methodology by looking at the lobby, as it was at the time of 
the 2009 scandal, and the lobby as documented more than 40 years earlier by Colin Seymour-
Ure (1968) and Jeremy Tunstall (1970) in their respective studies of Westminster journalists 
at work. I observed that the lobby's failure to spot the expenses scandal was:   
―... in part an institutional failure, built into the fabric of the lobby, but was also the result 
of trends and changes in parliament, politics and the media that have been gaining 
momentum in recent years and which, in retrospect, made what happened, if not 
inevitable, at least explicable.‖ (Gaber 2013a: 46). 
 
In particular I identified the fact that the lobby that Tunstall and Seymour-Ure observed was 
dominated by reporters from the regional press who, by the time of the 2009 scandal, had 
become very much a minority. The significance of this was that in the past the regional 
newspaper reporter, with just a few MPs in his or her patch, had the chance to get to know his 
or her local MPs in a way that national political correspondents never could. Hence, an MP 
having a lifestyle out of kilter with his or her salary, or ‗flipping‘ homes with the regularity 
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that we now know took place, would very soon have come to the notice of  their local 
political correspondent, particularly those able to follow MPs both at Westminster and in their 
home constituencies. In the absence of this sort of monitoring the continuing use of inflated 
expenses, as an adjunct to salary, never really came to the attention of most of the members 
of the lobby who only ever saw MPs at Westminster and, for the most part, were usually only 
really interested in front bench members. 
 
But there were other factors that I identified that also help to explain why this oversight took 
place. These included, the shift in the political journalists‘ focus from Parliament to the 
television studios and the online environment, the news intensification process (previously 
outlined), the decline in the Members Lobby as a key meeting point, the vast increase in the 
spin machines, the fact that for many in the lobby the issue of MPs‘ allowances was not seen 
as much of political interest and finally the efforts of those MPs who were abusing the 
expenses system to do their best to conceal their activities.  
 
Despite the fact that I had focussed much of my research on the workings of the Westminster 
lobby I had long been aware that political correspondents are not autonomous actors but are 
employees of large organisations, and that the political attitudes and interventions of their 
proprietors were the context within which they operated. Hence, in 2011 when the phone 
hacking scandal burst with the News of the World was at the centre of the storm, it was not 
long before the ownership and influence of Rupert Murdoch became a central issue of debate.  
I have produced five chapters or articles on aspects of this saga; in particular I have focussed 
on what the scandal and the subsequent Leveson Inquiry have told us about Rupert 
Murdoch‘s political influence and modus operandi.  I have selected two such articles for this 
submission.   
 
In the first, published in Media Culture and Society, – ‗Rupert and the ―Three Card Trope‖ – 
What You See Ain‘t Necessarily What You Get‘. I analysed how Murdoch used his media 
power to gain political power, or at least political influence  
 
In the wake of the hacking revelations Prime Minister David Cameron had been forced to 
admit that he and his colleagues had met and Murdoch and his colleagues 27 times in the year 
since coming to power in June 2010 - an average of a meeting once a fortnight.  I interrogated 
the figures in more detail and found that, because most of the meetings involved more than 
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one interlocutor from each side, the actual number of encounters between the Murdoch and 
the Cameron teams over the year was not 27, but 86 (Gaber 2012: 638). This, I argued, was a 
dramatic demonstration of just how unhealthily close the relationship had become. But I went 
on to ask whether such an intimate relationship was unique or was Murdoch simply applying 
to the Cameron Government the techniques he had used so successfully with Prime Ministers 
Thatcher, Blair and Brown?  
 
In seeking to answer this question I researched the frequency of contacts between the 
Cameron Government and other media organisations and looked at what could be uncovered 
about contacts between Murdoch and previous Labour and Conservative governments. In 
terms of the Cameron Government it emerged that in their first year of government he and his 
colleagues had had almost as many meetings with News International as they had had with all 
other news organisations combined (Ibid: 639). No comparable figures had been released by 
the Blair or Brown governments but by data mining the diaries of Alastair Campbell I was 
able to reveal that between 1994 and 2001 he made more references to Rupert Murdoch than 
to the editors of the Sun, the Daily Mirror and the Daily Mail as well as the Mail’s proprietor 
and the Director General of the BBC combined (Ibid). There was even less data available 
covering Thatcher/Murdoch meetings but what information there was, I suggested, was 
unreliable in the extreme. For example, in contrast to Campbell, Mrs Thatcher‘s memoirs 
make literally no reference to Murdoch at all (Thatcher 1995). However, I went on to point 
out that at the time of Murdoch‘s proposed takeover of The Times and the Sunday Times in 
1981 Mrs Thatcher had held a secret meeting with Murdoch, which her then press secretary, 
Bernard Ingham had cautioned should be treated as ‗confidential‘ (McSmith 2012) – how 
many other such ‗confidential‘ meetings took place can only be guessed at.  
 
From this ‗secret history‘ I went on to analyse how Murdoch operates, in terms of obtaining 
and maintaining the influence and power that he clearly wields over political leaders. I 
identified three ‗Murdoch ‗tropes' that, I argued, help us understand the Murdoch 
phenomenon. I suggested that: 
 ―  ...whilst, media magnates, both past and present, have tended to use their media interests 
in one of a number of causes – to advance a political cause, their business interests, their 
family interests or simply, themselves; for Murdoch all four seem to be equally important.‖ 
(Ibid: 641). 
 
I have subsequently re-thought this conclusion in the light of David McKnight‘s (2013) 
trenchant analysis of Murdoch‘s career in which he demonstrates that whilst Murdoch has 
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always had a number of career goals, his overwhelming motivation has been the advancement 
of his own particular brand of right-wing politics. However, my analysis of the Murdoch 
―tropes‖ as a means of increasing his political and corporate power and influence (if not his 
motivation) remains valid, for despite cultivating an image as just a ‗newspaperman‘ 
Murdoch has been adept at ensuring that his interests were globally spread and diversified 
across virtually all forms of media.  
 
I also documented Murdoch‘s ruthlessness, both in terms of his treatment of what he saw as 
under-performing individuals and of the agreements he had put his name to. I quoted his 
former editor Harold Evans as saying: ―Murdoch is the Houdini of agreements‖ (Evans 2011: 
xxix) and I concluded by speculating that perhaps the fall-out from the hacking scandal, and 
the subsequent closure of the News of the World, might be the undermining of the political 
power of Rupert Murdoch, at least as far as the UK was concerned: 
―... have the Murdoch tropes lost their magic? And if they have, has the time come for the 
81-year-old Wizard of Oz, to take his final bow, hang up his wand and retire gracefully 
behind the velvet curtain?‖ (Gaber 2012: 645). 
 
 
The second aspect of the hacking scandal here being submitted is a chapter - ―Two and a Half 
Cheers for Leveson‖ – from an edited collection After Leveson: the Future of British 
Journalism
xvi
. I used this chapter to look at Leveson‘s analysis of, and prescription for, the 
relations between politicians and the press, and, specifically, relations between press 
proprietors and managers, rather than those involving working journalists.  
 
In the furore which greeted Leveson‘s proposals for a statutorily underpinned system of self-
regulation of the press, little media (or academic) attention was paid to either his 359-page 
analysis of relations between press and politicians, and even less to his proposals aimed at 
seeking to ensure that, what he saw as, the unhealthy state of these relations which he 
described as ―too close to give sufficient grounds for confidence‖ (Leveson: 1119) was 
remedied. He offered a number of proposals that he suggested would put the relationships 
between senior media executives and politicians on a more transparent and equitable basis 
(proposals not dissimilar to those that I myself had sent to the Inquiry).  
 
However, the chapter title – two and half as opposed to three cheers – was occasioned by 
what I saw as Leveson‘s failure to draw the appropriate conclusions, from the evidence he 
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heard, about the conduct of Jeremy Hunt, the minister responsible for overseeing the 
proposed takeover of BSkyB by News International, whose relations with News International 
became matters of public concern. I expressed my surprise at Leveson's lenient treatment of 
Hunt. He castigated the minister for failing to properly supervise his special adviser (Adam 
Smith) when the Government was considering the News International bid (for example it was 
revealed that Smith had sent no fewer than 690 text messages to his News International 
counterpart during this period) and Leveson also suggested Hunt had failed in meeting the 
test of not only ‗being impartial‘ but ‗appearing to be impartial‘. Leveson observed: ―.. it is 
not clear that he (Hunt) fully understood just how scrupulous he needed to be to avoid the 
appearance of bias.‖ (Leveson:  1390). But he then went on to find that (despite this being a 
world where nothing was set down on paper), he could find no unambiguous evidence that 
Hunt had acted improperly. I opined that Leveson was perhaps being more charitable than 
necessary, when he concluded: ―In the circumstances, I accept what I have been told." 
(Leveson P. 1403). I suggested that perhaps a verdict of 'not proven' might have been more 
appropriate than 'not guilty'. 
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Election Coverage 
 
1. ―Dislocated and Distracted: Media, Parties and the Voters in the 2005 General 
Election Campaign"  British Politics (2006) 
 
2. ―The Hollowed-out Election; or where did all the policy go" (2013) Journal of 
Political Marketing (2013)  
 
3. ―The Transformation of Campaign Reporting: the 2010 UK General Election, 
Revolution or Evolution?‖ in Political Communication in Britain: The Leader 
debates, the Campaign and the Media in the 2010 General Election‖ Wring D. et al 
(eds.) (2011)  
 
 
My continuing interest in the relations between politicians and the media meant that a 
significant part of both my continuing professional practice, and my scholarly output, has 
revolved around election campaigns. Professionally I have been employed either as a 
consultant, or commentator, by either BBC or ITV News, in every General Election since 
becoming an academic in 1985. In research terms I have focussed on the parties' efforts to try 
and maximise positive coverage and minimise the negative during the weeks of the 
campaign. To this end I have published a number of election studies. During the 2005 
election I sought to investigate the relationship, if any, between the issue agendas of the 
media, the parties and the public. In ―Dislocated and Distracted: Media, Parties and the Voters 
in the 2005 General Election Campaign‖ published in British Politics, I argued that there was 
a demonstrable fracture between the various issue agendas pursued by the parties, the media 
and the voters. I based my argument both on my own experience working at ITV News 
during the election campaign and on a comprehensive content analysis of all the press 
releases distributed by the three main parties during the campaign. This built on earlier work 
that had sought to analyse election news agenda setting (Semetko et al 1991, Norris et al 
2000 and Brandenburg 2002).  
 
The argument I advanced for explaining this fracture was that campaigning, like political 
reporting, was changing. For whilst the national news media was still the predominant site of 
the campaign battle there was a trend  for parties to give ever-greater emphasis to finding 
means of communicating with the electorate that by-passed the national media (Franklin, 
2004; Kavanagh and Butler, 2005; Smith, 2005; Wring, 2005). In this article I introduced into 
the academic discussion a notion I had first heard about on the campaign trail – that of the 
‗air war‘ and the ‗ground war‘. The former was the campaign as fought in the national media, 
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mainly by the party leaders. The latter was the constituency-by-constituency battle that  took 
place in the marginal seats, largely below the radar of the national media, and involved 
politicians in direct contact with the electorate – by means of contact on the doorstep, by 
direct mail, phone calls, text messaging, local websites, email and social media. This is a 
distinction that did not suddenly come into existence in 2005 – although that was the first 
time I had found it so described - but had evolved. In the article I suggested that it had begun 
with the 1979 Conservative election campaign, but had become a major factor with the rise of 
New Labour.  I suggested that the deterioration in the political public sphere that I had 
charted in much of my work to date was one of the main drivers behind this change which I 
attributed to voter alienation from ‗traditional‘ politics, declining media interest in reporting 
campaigns and the parties‘ general frustration with the national media‘s reporting of politics.  
 
I also used this research to engage with debates around news agendas. I argued that it was not 
helpful to talk about ‗a news agenda‘ as such, but instead I identified a number of differing 
news agendas all in competition with each other throughout the campaign. These were the 
agendas of the three main parties, the differing media agendas of the tabloids, the broadsheets 
and the broadcasters and finally the  public‘s agenda - none of which seemed to impact 
markedly on any other, a point echoed by Pippa Norris (2006 and 2008) in her studies of the 
2005 election. My research also challenged the oft-quoted claims made by the parties that 
they always sought to run positive policy-orientated campaigns, as opposed to the negativity 
of their opponents and the media. My analysis clearly demonstrated that all three parties 
concentrated their media campaign tactics not on policy but on promoting themselves and, in 
particular, on attacking their opponents.  
 
I also demonstrated how, despite the parties‘ preoccupation that the economy was the key 
issue (as they had campaigned in 1997 and 2001), neither the media nor the public perceived 
the economic issues to be central to their own priorities. I concluded by asking whether these 
findings enabled one to say that election communication was undergoing a process of 
transition, similar to that which I had previously identified as impacting on political reporting 
- arising from the growing marketisation and  mediatisation of politics. I characterised 
campaigning in 2005 as ―new spin‖ in which the parties made use of a wide range of 
communication techniques, in contrast to‖old spin‖ which concentrated on their somewhat 
heavy-handed attempts to control the traditional media. I concluded by suggesting that 
whether this change was long-term, or merely a response to the particular circumstances of 
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2005, would have to await research following the next General Election. One commentary on 
my work, suggested that it might offer a breakthrough in our thinking about party media 
strategies. Jackson wrote that my research: ―... suggests that strategy stories are not just the 
invention of journalists, but can actually be driven by the agendas of the parties 
themselves.‖xvii (Jackson 2011: 173)  
  
I returned to these questions at the time of the 2010 election when I sought to undertake a 
similar content analysis of the parties‘ media releases in an article for the Journal of Political 
Marketing under the title ―The Hollowed-out Election; or where did all the policy go?"xviii  In 
this article I argued that, partly as a result of the focus on the leaders' debates, and partly 
because of the political convergence of Labour and the Conservatives, the 2010 election was 
an almost entirely policy-free environment, despite the plethora of media and communication 
initiatives by the parties and the greater levels of media interest in the campaign when 
compared with the 2005 election. 
 
Two factors made direct comparison between the 2005 and 2010 elections problematic. First, 
because the 2010 campaign was dominated by the first-ever televised leaders‘ debates, 
obviously not a factor in 2005, and second, because changes in campaigning, and in 
particular those resulting from the growing use of social media by the parties,  made it 
impossible to conduct an exact like-for-like comparison of the use of press releases by the 
parties. This was because in 2010, whilst the parties still made some use of traditional 
releases posted on their websites, they were also using blog posts, tweets and other forms of 
social media to alert journalists to their latest policy pronouncements and these initiatives did 
not lend themselves either to robust enumeration or comparison with 2005. There was a 
significant decline in the number of conventional press releases issued but it was impossible 
to argue that these had, or had not, been more than made up for by the increase in social 
media traffic.  
 
Nonetheless, I was able to conclude that, based on an analysis of the media and 
communications outputs of the parties, interviews with key actors, polling and my own 
experience as a participant in the media coverage of the election (I was the BBC World 
Service‘s on-air election expert), the campaign had even less policy content than in 2005, 
when that factor itself had been a noticeable feature of that campaign. I argued that: 
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―The 2010 election was characterised by a hollowed-out campaign, with policy differences 
between the parties drowned out by the noise of the leaders‘ debates.  But this noise also 
drowned out any suggestion that this process was actually taking place.‖ (Gaber 2013c: 
13).  
 
For my conclusion I drew upon a little noticed Labour press release in which the party 
bemoaned the fact that the broadcasters‘ campaign reporting was concentrating too much on 
the leaders‘ debates at the expense of coverage of wider policy issues. In the release the 
Labour Party asked the other main parties to join them in an approach to the broadcasters 
(which was not taken up). The Labour Party wrote: "... that whilst our manifestos were fully, 
fairly and properly covered, since then the usual specialist examination of specific policy 
areas has not been done‖ (Watt and Wintour 2010). I used this initiative to conclude: 
― Despite being written two weeks before polling day, this statement from the Labour Party 
stands as an appropriate epitaph on the hollowed-out campaign of 2010 which, if it is to be 
the model for the future, represents a trend that has worrying implications for the future 
democratic content of British election campaigns.‖ (Gaber2013c: 13). 
 
As a participant in the media‘s coverage of the 2010 campaign I was struck, not just by the 
absence of any substantive policy debate, but how, as a result of the dramatic changes in the 
media environment then taking place, the business of election news reporting was being 
radically transformed. These reflections were published in my contribution to the continuing 
post-election book series - Political Communication in Britain – ‗The Transformation of 
Campaign Reporting: the 2010 UK General Election, Revolution or Evolution?‘ 
  
In this chapter, based on my own experience and interviews with political journalists and 
party press officers, I argued that the 2010 election ―represented a transformative moment in 
the reporting of British General Election campaigns‖ (Gaber 2011: 26). I made this statement 
not just because the election featured the first-ever televised leaders‘ debates but less 
spectacularly, but no less profoundly, because of the revolutionary changes that I identified 
were transforming election reporting. These changes were taking place both within the parties 
and the media. For the parties the overwhelming concentration on the ‗ground war‘, first 
identified in the 2005 campaign, led to the almost total disappearance of the morning party 
press conferences and to significant changes in how parties used press releases, regional 
leaders‘ tours and other set-piece events. At the same time the parties were seeking evermore 
direct contact with the electorate in their target seats through face-to-face contacts, direct 
mail, phone calls, email and social media.  
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The transformation was also having a major impact on journalists‘ working practices. This 
was partly as a result of the changes taking place in the parties‘ campaigning methods but 
also because of the process of 'news intensification‘, discussed earlier. This intensification 
involved both the flow of information coming into political reporters‘ figurative, and actual, 
inboxes, and the almost constant demands being made on them to provide output for a range 
of digital news platforms. I sought to capture this intensification by contrasting two 
metaphorical snapshots of a political reporter‘s working day: 
―The first comes from the 2010 election and it would show a tweeting, blogging, web-
posting political reporter struggling to stay across all the news coming at him or her during 
the hectic days, and nights, of the campaign and also struggling to disseminate it. The 
second is the reporter, leading a more ordered, almost sepia-like, existence during the 1979 
campaign, the last time Labour was ejected from office. This was a time when there was 
no breakfast time television, no 24-hour TV and radio news, no mobile phones and the 
internet was no more than a twinkle in the eye of military planners and IT enthusiasts.‖ 
(Ibid: 262). 
 
In the case of the 2010 reporter, I drew attention to the fact that the timing of the leaders‘ 
debates on a Thursday meant that for virtually the entire three weeks of the campaign their 
lives were dominated by the debates. The weekend media set the tone by looking back at the 
previous week‘s debate and speculating as to the likely pattern of the debate to come; this 
speculation continued up until Thursday and began again on the Friday with both 
retrospective reports on the debate just completed and speculation on that which was to 
follow. The debates not only had a major impact on the politicians and parties, but also 
dramatically affected the reporting routines of the journalists, especially as the debates were 
held in three locations all outside London.  For the journalists, as well as the polit icians and 
party managers I interviewed, the debates changed the whole rhythm and conduct of the 
campaign. 
  
Adam Boulton, the long-serving Political Editor of Sky News, made a particularly strong 
statement in his interview, which gave me the conclusion to my article. His argument – and it 
has to be noted that this came from one of the debates‘ presenters - was that the 2010 election 
campaign had been transformative, not necessarily because of the reasons outlined above, but 
because the debates demonstrated, once and for all, that television was the dominant medium 
of the campaign. He said:     
―For the first time I cannot recall a single print interview or article which impacted on the 
work I was doing...I do not expect newspapers will ever again be the primary and 
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dominant force of political coverage – the electronic media will not give up that role.‖  
(Ibid: 277).  
 
From this I concluded by suggesting: 
 
 ―...[if] as seems likely, the leaders‘ debates are continued, the broadcasters (pace Adam 
Boulton) will again be able to claim that they are the main stage upon which the election is 
being fought. But their colleagues in the press will know that, in terms of the 
performances, they are the critics – and as any theatrical impresario will tell you - it‘s the 
critics, rather than the performers, who determines the public‘s reaction to the, in this case, 
electoral drama unfolding.‖ (Ibid: 280). 
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Bias and Representation 
1. Culture Wars: the media and the British Left with Curran J. and Petley J Edinburgh, 
Edinburgh University Press (2005)  
Chapter 7 ―Slaying the Dragon‖  
Chapter 8 ―Driven to Distraction” 
 
2. ―Is the BBC Biased: the Corporation and the Coverage of the 2006 Israeli-Hezbollah 
War‖ (2009) in Journalism, Theory, Practice and Criticism (2009) 
 
3. Three cheers for subjectivity: or the crumbling of the seven pillars of traditional 
journalistic wisdom in The End of Journalism? Charles A and Stewart G. eds. Peter 
Lang (2010) 
 
My interest in election news agendas also reflected a continuing interest I have had in 
agenda-setting in general, and in notions of framing and priming. This is represented in a 
number of content analysis research projects I have undertaken, here submitted. The first, 
commissioned by the Office of the Mayor of London, involved an analysis of how the 
national media had covered the introduction of the London congestion charge in 2003. My 
report, Driven to Distraction: an analysis of the media's coverage of the London congestion 
charge was published by Goldsmiths' Media Research Group (Gaber 2003). It demonstrated 
how the majority of the mainstream media reported the charge as a potentially major threat to 
the economic and social development of the capital; the reporting demonstrated significant 
bias and misrepresentation in their reporting of the story. Based on this report I published a 
briefer version of the report in a jointly authored book Culture Wars: the media and the 
British Left (with James Curran and Julian Petley) - here submitted - in which the media‘s 
bias in the reporting of the congestion charge was placed in the context of the media's more 
general approach to reporting the political left – particularly that part of it that came to be 
known as the London 'loony left'.  
 
In order to demonstrate that the biases and misrepresentations that I had identified were 
neither arbitrary nor accidental, I preceded my chapter summarising this research by one that 
put the media‘s approach to reporting Labour politics into its historical context. In the chapter 
here submitted, "Slaying the Dragon" I analysed how the media, in collusion with the then 
leadership of the Labour Party, sought to develop and exploit the notion of the 'loony left'. 
―Slaying the Dragon‖ represents, I believe, a good example of my combining my knowledge 
of, and professional expertise in, the media with my academic and practical background in 
reporting politics.  
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The starting point for the campaign against the Labour left came in the 1980s when the 
Conservatives, under Norman Tebbitt‘s guidance, encouraged the right-wing press to use the 
term ‗loony left‘ to characterise a Labour Party that had moved to the left and that therefore 
could be characterised as representing an ‗alien‘ threat to quintessential British values 
(Heffernan and Marquesee 1992, Fielding 2003, Finlayson 2003 and Bale 2010). However, in 
this chapter I revealed, through the use of primary sources and my professional experience, 
how the ‗loony left‘ threat was given added momentum, and was sustained in the media, not 
just by the Conservatives and their press allies but also by the Labour leadership itself. I 
demonstrated that the creation of New Labour and the election of Tony Blair required a 
general acceptance – and here the media was crucial – that the Party had undergone a radical 
transformation, so radical that in fact it was virtually a ‗new‘ party. To make this credible it 
was necessary for the old Labour Party to be characterised as not just ‗old‘ but extremist and 
out-of-touch – a dragon that New Labour had to vanquish. I suggested that this had come 
about, not just out of electoral necessity, but was also a result of how the mediatisation of 
political communications (Strömbäck 2008) had affected politics and political 
communication. In what is a common theme throughout this commentary, I wrote; 
―The rise of New Labour was not just associated with the rise of the political marketing 
paradigm - a trend in itself that owed much to the privatisation of public life - a paradigm 
which saw voters as consumers, policies as products and parties as sales organisations. It 
was also associated with the near total dominance, of electioneering by the mass media; so 
as parties shifted from being organisations of volunteer leafleteers and door-knockers to 
professionalised organisations dedicated to persuading and mobilising the public, so the 
defining of what was 'politically acceptable' to the electorate became something that 
became more and more dominated by the mass media rather than, as it had been in the 
past, a process that was the preserve of the political parties and their decision-making 
processes. ―(Gaber 2005a:  191). 
 
A significant feature of this process of the marketisation of political parties was the central 
role given to focus group research – articulated by President Clinton who said:  
"There is no one more powerful today than the member of a focus group. If you really 
want to change things and you want to get listened to, that's the place to be.‖xix  
 
The late Phillip Gould, a key adviser to Tony Blair, was the main protagonist in New Labour 
arguing for the importance of the focus group. In this chapter I argued that he had misused 
this research technique, to advance his own political aims. In his autobiographical The 
Unfinished Revolution (1998) he described his unorthodox approach to moderating focus 
groups:  ―I do not just sit there and listen.‖ he wrote, ―I challenge, I argue back, I force them 
to confront issues.‖(Gould 1998: 213). I questioned this approach: 
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―Exciting stuff it might be but objective research it certainly is not. If, and it's not a big 'if', 
Gould was convinced that one of Labour's major weaknesses was the perception that it 
was not trusted, and that the principle cause of this was that the Party was perceived to be 
dominated by the 'hard left', it is hardly surprising that he came back with the news that 
that was exactly what people believed - especially in the light of his own particular 
'research method'. As one reads Gould's account of his encounters with focus groups it is 
difficult to dispel from one's mind the image of a hapless group of focus group subjects 
sitting in a North London front room in the early nineties, being forced to 'admit'  (à la 
―1984‖) that it was the 'loony left' that had kept them from voting Labour.‖ (Gaber 2005a: 
214). 
  
I then drew attention to the fact that Gould‘s, and subsequently New Labour‘s, approach to 
research drew the risk of their failing to learn the lesson of the ‗spiral of silence‘ - first 
revealed by Elizabeth Noelle-Neumann (1993). The spiral is the way that certain attitudes and 
views become deemed as 'socially acceptable' and others 'unacceptable'. Respondents, when 
faced with researchers (particularly face-to-face), will often seek to give the 'correct' i.e. 
socially acceptable answer. The significance of this, as I observed in the chapter, was that:  
―Gould's views about what voters were thinking carried significant weight in Labour's 
inner circles; in his own words: 'I was seen as the voice of the electorate.' (Gaber 2005a: 
215). 
 
 
Having supposedly slain the dragon of 'old Labour' and two years after New Labour‘s 
triumph at the polls, the leadership again had to face up its ‗loony left‘ demons when Ken 
Livingstone sought to become the Party‘s candidate for the position of the first-ever elected 
mayor of London. For many in the Labour leadership Livingstone personified all the worst 
elements of the 'loony left' and, as I outlined, they resurrected the loony left dragon in an 
unsuccessful attempt to block Livingstone‘s candidature. They did succeed in denying him 
the Labour nomination but Livingstone ultimately triumphed by running and winning the 
mayoralty as an independent.   
 
On being elected, one of his first, and most significant, policy initiatives was to introduce the 
London congestion charge. In the run-up to its introduction Livingstone, and the charge, were 
subjected to a hostile campaign by much of the media, spearheaded by the London Evening 
Standard. Much of this coverage, which I outlined in the second chapter of the book  here 
submitted  - ―Driven to Distraction‖ - echoed the loony left campaigns of the past; and I 
found evidence that this too was being encouraged, or at least not discouraged, by the Labour 
leadership. 
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The research, upon which the chapter was based, involved an analysis of  all the congestion 
charge coverage in the national daily and Sunday newspapers, the Evening Standard, the 
London daily free-sheet the Metro and the main bulletins on BBC TV and ITV for London 
from 1 January 2002 to 31 May 2003. I undertook a detailed content and discourse analysis 
of this material and I also used this data to look at issues around framing, sourcing and 
representation.  The principle theme of the chapter was that media coverage of the charge was 
framed around the notion of ‗the loony left rides again‘ – a frame initially encouraged by the 
Labour leadership‘s attempts to block Livingstone‘s election as mayor and then again, as they 
attempted to distance themselves from his more controversial policies.  
 
The content analysis revealed that the terms 'loony left' and 'Red Ken' were used frequently 
by the press in the period under review. Perhaps unsurprisingly the Sun topped the table with 
29 references to ‗Red Ken‘ and 10 to the ‗loony left' just behind was the Daily Telegraph 
which referred to 'Red Ken' 31 times and the 'loony left' 7 times and the Evening Standard 
which referred to ‗Red Ken‘ 23 times and the ‗loony left‘ 14 times (2005b: 233). 
 
Deeper analysis revealed that, for the press, the term 'loony left' had three distinct 
resonances. The first connected Livingstone with 'insanity', the second with 
'authoritarianism' and the third with 'left-wing extremism' - these last two being 
inextricably linked (Ibid: 229).  Hence, much of the coverage framed the story in terms 
of fear - Livingstone was portrayed as a threatening authoritarian madman 
determined to impose his wild ideas on London, irrespective of the consequences. I 
noted how journalists tended to privilege certain primary definers as authoritative sources of 
information about the possible effects of the charge and this was reflected by the ease which 
many of these sources were able to feed the media scare stories, most of which subsequently 
proved to be without foundation. The Evening Standard carried more ‗scare‘ stories than 
any other paper – a total of 33 were identified, of which there were 13 in the two months 
prior to the introduction of the charge. The other London daily, the Metro, carried 21 
scare stories, of which 11 were run in these last two months. Figures for other papers 
included the Daily Telegraph at 27 of which 10 were in the last two months, but pride 
of place – so to speak - must go to the Mail on Sunday which, whilst only appearing 
once a week, came up with 16 scare stories, 10 of which were run in the two months 
before the charge came in (Ibid: 235). 
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One particular long-running scare story, which the research deconstructed in detail, was to be 
found predominantly, but not exclusively, in the Evening Standard (Ibid: 236-239). It 
concerned an allegation that the Mayor was manipulating the phasing of traffic lights in 
central London as part of a grand ‗conspiracy‘ to make the congestion charge, when it was 
introduced, appear to be working better than it was. The research identified two aspects of 
this story which throw an interesting light on some of the ethical practices of the press - a 
familiar litany heard during the Leveson Inquiry a decade later. The first was that the initial 
sourcing of the ‗conspiracy‘ in the Evening Standard was so absurdly vague that it is of some 
surprise that the paper chose to run the story at all, let alone on its front page. The paper 
attributed their scoop to anonymous ―sources‖ - with not even an attempt to suggest their 
sources‘ general provenance or standing. But having then published the story the paper was 
subsequently able to dispense with even this limp attribution and began sourcing the story to 
itself, using the phrase ―as exclusively revealed in the Evening Standard” - a curiosity of 
journalistic reflexivity.  
 
Equally fascinating was how the paper characterised Livingstone‘s outright denial of the 
allegation - as one headline put it: 'Ken Livingstone: refusing to come clean on "secret" plans 
to rig London's traffic lights' (Evening Standard 7 March 2003). In other words, as I wrote at 
the time: 
―... the Mayor was placed in a situation in which he was offered the choice of 
admitting that the Evening Standard's story was true - and thus being found guilty 
of practising a massive deceit on the people of London - or denying the charge and 
being found guilty of covering up the conspiracy. Either way he was presented as 
being either 'guilty', or 'guilty'.‖ (Ibid: 237). 
 
 
The chapter ended with conclusions about the overall significance of the coverage and I took 
the opportunity of reiterating my concerns about the deteriorating state of the political public 
sphere in London, given the Evening Standard's monopoly position: 
―As the monopoly supplier in the paid-for London newspaper market the Evening 
Standard has a responsibility to provide Londoners with reliable and balanced 
coverage of the affairs of the capital. In the case of congestion charging it appears 
that through much of the build-up to the introduction of the charge, this they 
failed to do.‖(Ibid: 248/9). 
 
Another content analysis research project I undertook around this time was into how BBC TV 
News covered the 2006 war between Israel and Hezbollah, commissioned by the Britain-
Israel Communications and Research Centre. In order to make this evaluation academically 
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robust I also used ITV News‘ coverage over the same period as a control group. Overall I 
concluded that the BBC's coverage could be characterised as broadly unbiased, particularly 
when compared with ITV‘s. This research was published in Journalism, Theory, Practice and 
Criticism in 2009 under the title ―Is the BBC Biased: the Corporation and the Coverage of the 
2006 Israeli-Hezbollah War.‖ 
 
The BBC's coverage of the Israel/Palestine dispute has long attracted controversy, with both 
sides in the ongoing conflict firmly convinced of the bias of the Corporation. In 2006 the 
BBC Governors conducted a review of their coverage which resulted in the creation of a new 
set of Middle East editorial guidelines; these were published shortly after the Israel/Hezbollah 
war broke out. This research sought to measure the BBC's coverage against its own new 
editorial guidelines and against the coverage of ITV News.  
 
A content analysis of all coverage of the war on the two flagship television news bulletins – 
the BBC News at 10.00pm and the ITV News at 10.30pm – was undertaken. This involved 
logging and analysing a total of 228 separate news items. I utilised a framing approach and 
analysed the coverage in terms of the range of different news frames that were detected to be 
in use by the broadcasters. This revealed that approximately a quarter of both the BBC‘s and 
ITV‘s coverage was framed around the direct impact the war was having on the population of 
southern Lebanon whilst 10 per cent was framed in terms of the impact on the Israeli 
population; I noted: 
―... this might appear to represent a disparity in coverage favouring the Lebanese side but, 
given the disparity in casualties – a rough ratio of 10 Lebanese casualties to every Israeli 
casualty – there was in fact a pro-Israeli bias in coverage by both the BBC and ITV.‖  
(Gaber 2009: 246). 
 
Other news frames detected included Israel‘s military and/or political goals, international 
politics and diplomacy, the plight of evacuees from Lebanon (mainly British) and finally 
‗context‘ which despite the BBC guidelines stressing its importance, received just 9.6 percent 
of the BBC‘s coverage and only 3.6 percent of ITV‘s (Ibid: 247). 
 
As outlined in the methodology section above, I developed a unique mode of analysis that 
sought to combine qualitative and quantitative approaches that enable me to make 
generalisations to in both broad terms about the coverage but also in terms of my conclusions 
about the central question, namely ‗Is the BBC Biased?‘ By using the notion of ‗Point of 
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View‘ (POV), and by the use of double blind pilots to ensure that the coding frame was 
robust, I could draw conclusions that were methodologically sound and, as yet, have not been 
challenged. Using this methodology I found that the BBC achieved broad parity overall in 
reflecting both an Israeli POV and a Lebanese/Hezbollah POV. ITV News was somewhat less 
successful in terms of balance, demonstrating a bias against Israel (mainly accounted for by 
its greater enthusiasm for dramatic pictorial coverage of the Lebanese civilian victims of 
Israeli bombing raids) (Ibid: 248). 
 
Whilst making a certain number of criticisms of the BBC's coverage I concluded: 
―  ... [it] is difficult to avoid the conclusion that, given the complexities of the issue, the 
pressures of time and space and the sheer difficulties of reporting from hostile 
environments, both BBC and ITV News acquitted themselves well in their reporting of the 
2006 Israeli–Hezbollah war.‖ (Ibid: 258). 
 
 
In the same year I looked at another major ethical issue facing political journalists, namely 
how new media, and the related phenomenon of citizen journalism, was impacting on long-
standing debates about objectivity. In ―Three cheers for Subjectivity: or the crumbling of the 
seven pillars of journalistic wisdom‖ published in The End of Journalism? News in the 
twenty-first century, I suggested that new technology had simplified this debate and made a 
new 'ethical subjectivity' a journalistic imperative. I argued that this applied to both 
mainstream and citizen journalists alike. I suggested that the creation of a new breed of 
journalists – bloggers and other social media activists – was bringing into sharp focus the 
debates around objectivity. This was because many of these new journalists felt no sense of 
attachment to the traditional nostrums of journalistic behaviour which are encapsulated by the 
notion of objectivity, indeed they often glorified in distancing themselves from such 
nostrums. 
 
Based on my experience as a political journalist, and given the way that non-traditional 
journalism is changing our understanding of the journalistic process, I argued for a radical 
new approach to ethics that put subjectivity, rather than objectivity, at its heart. My 
interpretation of subjectivity, in this context, was to suggest that all journalists – traditional 
and new – should, as a first step, recognise their own predispositions and then seek to report 
and write using as their yardstick, not objectivity, but ‗fairness‘. This I interpreted as 
something that is wholly subjective and can only effectively be interrogated and validated by 
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the journalist him or herself. This is because it is ultimately only the person who has observed 
the event, gathered the material or undertaken the interviews, who is really in a position to 
judge whether the overall thrust of the final media artefact answers the question ―Is this fair?‖ 
 
I developed this proposition by first demonstrating the fallaciousness not just of the notion of 
achieving objectivity – described by Kovach and Rosenstiel as ―one of the great confusions 
of journalism‖ (2007: 81) but also of, what many journalists and journalism academics 
propose as an alternative, that of making objectivity an ultimate, if unachievable, goal. I 
suggested that these were misleading and unhelpful propositions: 
―Every attempt by journalists to argue that they are able to put aside their own beliefs, 
feelings etc. and become, or aspire to become, genuinely ‗objective‘, strengthens a 
dangerous canard. For it is when journalists believe they have attained Olympian 
objectivity that they are in greatest danger of failing to see how their own conscious and 
unconscious motivations are affecting what and how they report.‖ (Gaber 2010: 5). 
 
In retrospect I would argue that this perhaps puts the case too starkly and that I probably 
overstated the subjectivity/objectivity divide. For example Kovach and Rosenstiel suggest 
that objectivity should be seen as a journalistic methodology rather than as a goal, they 
describe it as: 
 ―.... a consistent method of testing information – a transparent approach to evidence – 
precisely so that personal and cultural biases would not undermine the accuracy of their 
work.‖ (Kovach and Rosenstiel 2007: 88).  
  
In the submitted article, I invoked two sets of journalistic imperatives, one that might appeal 
to what I termed 'traditional‘ journalists and the other that seemed more appropriate for less 
traditionally-minded journalists, and for bloggers and other citizen journalists. The first I 
characterised as ―The Seven Pillars of Traditional Journalistic Wisdom‖ namely: 
    ―Journalists seek to be objective, bloggers do not. 
 Journalists are interested in ‗the truth‘, for bloggers this is negotiable. 
 Journalists are impartial, bloggers are not. 
 Journalists seek balance, bloggers do not. 
 Journalists are unbiased, bloggers are proudly biased 
 Journalists are independent, bloggers are not. 
 Journalists strive to ‗get it right, bloggers do not.‖  (Gaber 2010: 6). 
 
I made it clear that these imperatives were a set of ‗straw men‘ constructed for the purposes 
of advancing the argument, but I used them to demonstrate that at the heart of these notions 
was objectivity, with all the shortcomings set out above. But there were also other 
shortcomings in the traditional ethical codes and practices of journalism. These included the 
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notion that there was one single ‗truth‘ to be gathered and reported, that ‗balance‘ implies that 
all issues have two equally valid sides and also how concepts such as ‗impartiality‘ ‗lack of 
bias‘ and' independence‘ are not much more than elaborations of the idea of the attainability 
of journalistic detachment that is at the heart of the objectivity canard. 
 
 I then contrasted these ‗traditional pillars‘ with what I termed, ―The Seven Pillars of New 
Journalistic Wisdom‖, applicable to journalists and bloggers alike. These I enumerated as: 
―Thou shalt recognise one's own subjectivity. 
  Thou shalt strive to be fair. 
  Thou shalt strive to be accurate. 
  Thou shalt strive to be thorough. 
  Thou shalt seek verification. 
  Thou shalt strive to be transparent. 
  Thou shalt be accountable.‖ (Ibid: 8). 
 
Again, drawing on my own experience, I illustrated how the application of these practices 
could lead to a journalism that was, both in terms of ethics and content, more satisfactory for 
both journalists and audiences alike. The linked issues of subjectivity and fairness have 
already been discussed; but I was also keen to demonstrate, or at least advocate, that all those 
practising journalism, in whatever medium, should strive to be accurate, thorough, 
transparent and to produce work that was verifiable and accountable (Ibid: 8). 
 
One weakness of this article - less apparent at the time of writing but which has now moved 
into sharper focus - was my failure to differentiate between the various types of bloggers and 
citizen journalists. Certainly there are many journalists writing for non-mainstream websites 
and blogspots – both generalist and specialist – who seek to convey information to their 
audiences as fairly and accurately as possible. However, there are also those who don‘t – 
accuracy might be high on their aspirational list but fairness is not. Hence, in UK political 
reportage, for example, one might contrast PoliticsHome or the Huffington Post (both widely-
read and seeking ‗fairness‘) with Guido Fawkes' influential and equally well-informed, but 
totally biased blogspot ‗Order, Order‘ (and although he does break news stories, they are 
almost always in line with his political predispositions).  Guido Fawkes – real name Paul 
Staines - makes no claims to objectivity as he makes clear himself on his website: 
―The primary motivation for the creation of the blog was purely to make mischief at the 
expense of politicians and for the author‘s own self-gratification.... The British 
blogosphere was at that time full of wannabee Telegraph and Guardian leader writers. 
Guido set out to be sensationalist, Matt Drudge was an inspiration, Kelvin Mackenzie‘s 
Sun of the 80s was another.‖ (Staines 2013)  
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However, Staines also makes clear that he sees himself very much as a journalist - in the 
muckraking tradition: he writes: 
―Guido sees himself as a journalist, a campaigning journalist who publishes via a website. 
He campaigns against political sleaze and hypocrisy. He doesn‘t believe in impartiality nor 
pretend to it.‖ (Ibid). 
 
Such a stance, which is not unique to the Guido Fawkes website, indicates the complexity of 
trying to create ethical codes that are appropriate for both the mainstream and the new media 
– an issue that Lord Justice Leveson body-swerved around in his final report. 
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Future Research Trajectories 
The complexities and confusions of the ―Order, Order‖ blogspot is an appropriate point to 
end this commentary and to suggest new research trajectories. This is because the impact and 
influence of Guido Fawkes is something that no scholar of political communications can 
ignore, and that few predicted. Clearly one of the key areas for research lies in monitoring the 
continuing impact of the digital media on the political public sphere and evaluating to what 
extent the trend,  which in the first section of this commentary, I suggested might be 
emerging – that of an enhancement of the democratic conversation – is sustained or 
chimerical. We are still in relatively unchartered waters, for whilst we have now had almost 
two decades of experience of web-based political communication, the social media are still 
very much in their infancy. With Facebook and Twitter now so much a part of everyday 
political communications it is easy to forget that Facebook was only launched in 2004 and 
Twitter in 2006.  
 
Along with the impact of the social media on political communications, scholars will also 
need to be evaluating the impact of the continuing decline of newspapers as key agenda-
setters in the political debate. Adam Boulton, Political Editor of Sky News, has said, only half 
jokingly, that the main role of newspapers today is to fill the ‗Tomorrow‘s Press‘ slot on the 
24-hour TV news channels (Boulton 2013). Whilst the decline in circulation of the press has 
been a long-term phenomenon, newspapers have still, for the most part, been able to retain a 
key role in setting the national political agenda. For how much longer that will be the case, if 
it still is, and what impact this will have on the political communication process, is another 
factor that will need continuing analysis and evaluation. 
 
One constant in this media landscape has been the sustained importance of mainstream 
broadcasters as the public‘s primary, and most trusted source of political news (Hansard 
2012) and although, with the rise of all other sources of news now available, the actual 
numbers tuning into the main national television news bulletins has been in decline, the BBC 
and ITV and, to a lesser extent Sky News, will remain major factors within the political 
communication landscape, and hence will continue to be important points of focus for 
scholars.
xx
 
 
As the rate of change in the media landscape shows no signs of slowing down, so too the 
political landscape is in equal flux. The public‘s disillusionment with the formal political 
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process, which was given particular potency by the 2009 MPs‘ expenses scandal, continues to 
be a major preoccupation of policymakers and scholars alike (Hansard 2012)
xxi
.  The 
consequences of this are long term, but in the short term there have been two developments 
of interest to political communication scholars. First, there was the 2010 General Election in 
which no party succeeded in winning a majority of seats in the House of Commons and 
which led to the formation of Britain‘s first peace-time coalition government since 1935. 
Second, there has been the more recent rise of the UK Independence Party (UKIP) which 
many commentators have seen as the articulation of the ‗plague on both your houses‘ attitude 
which reflects the current public mood. A YouGov Poll immediately after UKIP gained 23% 
of the vote in local government elections (May 2013) revealed that, after concerns about 
immigration and the European Union, ―Unhappy with major parties‖ was the third most 
important reason given for voting for UKIP (YouGov)
xxii
. 
 
One intriguing aspect of UKIP‘s success in 2013 is that the party has risen to become the 
third most popular party in the UK
xxiii
 with no significant online profile and with national 
media coverage that has, for the most part, been either negative or patronising. Clearly a 
charismatic leader with good media skills has been a factor as, perhaps, has been his 
patronising treatment by the mainstream media. In the wake of the recent scandals concerning 
MPs‘ expenses and journalists‘ phone-hacking a popular notion has been created – 
particularly, but not exclusively, by UKIP - that sees the political and media establishments as 
engaged in a ―conspiracy against the public‖.  Nonetheless UKIP‘s political rise challenges a 
number of key assumptions that scholars have been making about the mediatisation of the 
political public sphere.  
 
Thus, in terms of new research agendas for this, and other scholars in the field, there is no 
shortage of new challenges and approaches to the ongoing ‗crisis in political 
communications‘ – if there is one. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ivor Gaber: A Crisis in Political Communications? Reflections of a Critical Practitioner submitted as part of a PhD by Prior Publication 
 
61 
REFERENCES 
 
Bale, T. (2010) The Conservative Party from Thatcher to Cameron Cambridge, Polity Press 
 
Barnett, S.  (1998) ―Dumbing Down or Reaching Out: Is it Tabloidisation wot done it?‖ 
Political Quarterly Vol.. 69 pp 75–90 
 
Barnett, S. and Gaber, I. (1992) ―Committees on Camera: MPs and Lobby Views on the 
Effects of Televising Commons Select Committees‖ in Parliamentary Affairs Vol. 45 No 3 pp 
409 - 419 
 
Barnett S and Gaber I (2001) Westminster Tales: the twenty first century crisis in political 
journalism, London, Continuum 
 
Barnett, S., Gaber, I. and Ramsay, G. (2012) From Callaghan to Credit Crunch: Changing 
Trends in British Television News 1975 – 2009 London, University of Westminster 
 
Barnett, S., Gaber, I. and Seymour, E. (2000) From Callaghan to Kosovo: Changing Trends 
in British Television News 1975 – 1999, London University of Westminster 
 
Blair, T. (2007) Reuters' speech on public life 12/06/2007 available at:  
http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/1/hi/uk_politics/6744581.stm accessed on 09/04/2013 
 
Blumler, J. and McQuail, D. (1968) Television in Politics: its uses and influences London, 
Faber and Faber 
 
Blumler, J.  and Gurevitch, M. (1995) The Crisis of Public Communication London, 
Routledge 
 
Blumler, J. and Gurevitch, M. (2001) ―The New Media and our Political Communication 
Discontents: democratizing cyberspace Information, Communication and Society Vol.4:1 1–
13 
 
Blumler, J. and Coleman, S. (2009) The Internet and Democratic Citizenship: Theory, 
practice and policy Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 
 
Blumler, J. and Coleman, S. (2010) Political Communication in Freefall: The British Case—
and Others? The International Journal of Press/Politics Vol. 15: 139-154 
 
Boulton, A. (2012) speaking at City University London to the MA Political Journalism course 
06/12/ 2012 
 
Boulton A (2013) speaking at the Royal Television Society/All Party Parliamentary Group 
meeting on ‗Television Political Reporting: Is it balanced? Is it fair? Is there enough?‘ 23 
April 2013 Westminster  
 
Boyd-Barrett, O. (1980) The International News Agencies London, Constable 
 
Ivor Gaber: A Crisis in Political Communications? Reflections of a Critical Practitioner submitted as part of a PhD by Prior Publication 
 
62 
Brake, T. (2013) Facebook Has Made Me a Better MP 27/03/2013 
http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/tom-brake/facebook-has-made-me-a-better 
mp_b_2962115.html  Accessed 8/04/2013 
 
Brandenburg, H. (2002) ‗Who Follows Whom? The Impact of Parties on Media Agenda 
Formation in the 1997 British General Election Campaign‘ The International Journal of 
Press/Politics, Vol. 7, No. 3, 34-54 
 
Calhoun, C. (1992) ―Further Reflections on the Public Sphere‖ in Calhoun Habermas and the 
Public Sphere Cambridge, Massachusetts Institute of Technology  
 
Castells, M. (2008) ‗The New Public Sphere: Global Civil Society, Communication 
Networks, and Global Governance‘ Annals of the American Academy of Political Science 
Vol. 616, No. 1, 78-93. 
 
Campbell, A. (1998) Oral Evidence to the House of Commons Select Committee on Public 
Administration, 23/06/1998 London, Hansard 
 
Campbell, A. (2010) Prelude to Power The Alastair Campbell Diaries: Vol. 1 1994-1997 
London, Hutchinson 
 
Campbell, A. (2011) Power and the People: The Alastair Campbell Diaries Volume Two: 
May 1997 to June 1999 London, Hutchinson 
 
Campbell, A. (2011) Power and Responsibility The Alastair Campbell Diaries Volume Three: 
1999 to 2001 London, Hutchinson 
 
Cho, Y, I (2004)  ‗Intercoder Rewliabilitt in Lavrakas P. (ed) the Encyclopedia of Survey 
Research Methods Thousand oaks CA, Sage 
 
Cockerell, M, Hennessy, P. and Walker, D. (1984) Sources Close to the Prime Minister: 
inside the hidden world of the news manipulators London, Macmillan,  
 
Cohen, S. (1972) Folk Devils and Moral Panics: The Creation of the Mods and Rockers 
London, McGibbon Kee 
 
Cohen, S. and Young, J. (1981) The Manufacture of News: social problems, deviance and the 
mass media London, Constable,  
 
Curran, J. (1991) ‗Re-thinking the Media as a Public Sphere‘ in Dahlgren, P. and Sparks, C. 
Communication and Citizenship: journalism and the public sphere Routledge, London 
 
Curran, J. (1998) ‗Crisis of public communication: a reappraisal 1998‘, in Liebes, T. and 
Curran, J. (eds.) Media Ritual and Identity London, Routledge, 
 
Dahlgren, P. (1995) Television and the Public Sphere, Citizenship, Democracy and the Media 
London, Sage 
 
Davies, A. (2010) Political Communication and Social Theory London, Routledge 
 
Ivor Gaber: A Crisis in Political Communications? Reflections of a Critical Practitioner submitted as part of a PhD by Prior Publication 
 
63 
Davies, N. (2006) Flat Earth News: An Award-Winning Reporter Exposes Falsehood, 
Distortion and Propaganda in the Global Media London, Chatto and Windus 
 
Davis, R. (1999) The Web of Politics: The Internet’s Impact on the American Political 
System Oxford, Oxford University Press. 
 
Dawkins, R. (1989) The Selfish Gene Oxford, Oxford University Press,  
 
Dewey, J. (1927) The Public and its Problems Athens Ohio, Ohio University Press  
 
Dutton, W. (1996) ‗Network rules of order: regulating speech in public electronic fora‘ Media 
Culture and Society Vol. 18, 269–90. 
 
Dutton, W. and Black, G. (2011) Next Generation Users: The Internet in Britain Oxford, 
Oxford Internet Institute 
 
Entman, R. (1993) Framing:Toward Clarification of a Fractured Paradigm Journal of 
Communication Vol. 43, Issue 4, 51–58 
 
Esser, F. (1999) A Comparative Analysis of Anglo-American and German Press Journalism 
European Journal of Communication Vol. 14, No. 3, 291-324 
 
Evans, H. (2011) Good Times, Bad Times London, Open Road  
Fallows, J. (1996) Breaking the News: How the Media Undermine American Democracy New 
York, Pantheon Books 
 
Fielding, S. (2003) The Labour Party: continuity and change in the making of ‘New Labour” 
Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan 
 
Finer, M. and McGregor O. (1977) Royal Commission on the Press London, HMSO 
 
Finlayson, A. (2003) Making Sense of New Labour London, Lawrence and Wishart  
 
Francoli, M. and Ward, S. (2008) ‗21st century soapboxes? MPs and their blogs‘ in 
Information Polity Vol.13, No. 1-2  
 
Franklin, B. (1992) (ed.) Televising Democracies London, Routledge  
 
Franklin, B. (1997) Newszak and News Media London, Thomas Arnold 
 
Franklin, B. (2004) Packaging Politics: Political Communications in Britain’s Media 
Democracy London, Arnold 
 
Gaber, I. (1981) 'The Media and the Third World' (1981) Multiracial Education Vol. 9, No. 2, 
104 - 108 
 
Gaber, I. (1992) ―Committees on Camera: MPs and Lobby Views on the Effects of Televising 
Commons Select Committees‖ Parliamentary Affairs Vol. 45 No 3 409 - 419 
 
Ivor Gaber: A Crisis in Political Communications? Reflections of a Critical Practitioner submitted as part of a PhD by Prior Publication 
 
64 
Gaber, I. (1996) ‗Hocus-Pocus Polling: You Can Get Any Result You Want from a Focus 
Group. That Doesn't Mean It Will Be Right‘ New Statesman 16/08/1996 Vol. 125, No. 4297 
 
Gaber, I. (1997) ‗The View from the Newsrooms of the UK and the International Agencies‖ 
in Environmentalism and the Mass Media: the North South Divide Chapman, G. et al London, 
Routledge, 36 – 53 
 
Gaber, I. (2000) ―Government by spin: an analysis of the process‖ in Media Culture and 
Society Vol. 22 No. 4, 507 -518 
 
Gaber, I. (2001a) ‗Controlling the Whitehall machine‘ in Barnett, S. and Gaber, I. 
Westminster Tales: the 21
st
 Century Crisis in Political Journalism London, Continuum 
 
Gaber, I. (2001b) ‗The Changing Reporting Culture‘ in Barnett, S. and Gaber, I. Westminster 
Tales: the 21
st
 Century Crisis in Political Journalism London, Continuum 
 
Gaber, I. (2003) Driven to Distraction: an analysis of the media's coverage of the London 
congestion charge London, Goldsmiths' Media Research Group  
 
Gaber, I. (2005a) Slaying the Dragon‖ in Curran, J., Gaber, I and Petley, J. Culture Wars: the 
Media and the British Left Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press, 187- 223 
 
Gaber, I.  (2005b)  ‗Driven to Distraction‘ in Curran, J., Gaber, I and Petley, J. Culture Wars: 
the Media and the British Left Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press, 224 - 254 
 
Gaber, I. (2006) ―Dislocated and Distracted: Media, Parties and the Voters in the 2005  
General Election Campaign‖ British Politics, Vol. No. 3, 344- 366 
 
Gaber, I. (2007) ‗Too much of a good thing: the ‗problem‘ of political communications in a 
mass media democracy‘ Journal of Public Affairs Vol.7, No.3, 219–234  
 
Gaber, I. (2009) ‗Is the BBC Biased: the Corporation and the Coverage of the 2006 Israeli-
Hezbollah War‘ Journalism, Theory, Practice and Criticism Vol. 10, No. 2, 239 – 260 
 
Gaber, I. (2010) ‗Three cheers for subjectivity: or the crumbling of the seven pillars of 
traditional journalistic wisdom‘ in The End of Journalism? Charles A and Stewart G. (eds.) 
Oxford, Peter Lang  
 
Gaber, I. (2011) ‗The Transformation of Campaign Reporting: the 2010 UK General Election, 
Revolution or Evolution?‖ in Political Communication in Britain: The Leader Debates, the 
Campaign and the Media in the 2010 General Election‖ Wring D., et al (eds.) Basingstoke, 
Palgrave Macmillan, 261-280   
 
Gaber, I. (2012) ‗Rupert and the Three Card Trope – What You See Ain't Necessarily What 
You Get‘ Media Culture and Society Vol. 34, No. 5, 637 – 646  
 
Gaber, I. (2013a) ‗The Lobby in transition: what the 2009 MPs expenses scandal revealed 
about the changing relationship between politicians and the Westminster lobby‘ Media 
History Vol. 19, No. 21, 45 - 58 
 
Ivor Gaber: A Crisis in Political Communications? Reflections of a Critical Practitioner submitted as part of a PhD by Prior Publication 
 
65 
Gaber, I. (2013b) ‗Two and a Half Cheers for Leveson‘ in After Leveson: the Future of British 
Journalism Keble, R. and Mair, J. (eds.) Bury St Edmunds, Abramis Academic, 132-142 
 
Gaber (2013c) ‗The Hollowed-out Election; or where did all the policy go Journal of 
Political Marketing Vol. 12 Nos. 2/3   
 
Gans, H. (1979) Deciding What’s News: a Study of CBS Evening News NBC Nightly News,  
Newsweek and Time New York, Random House  
 
Gitlin, T. (1998) ‗Public sphere or public sphericules‘, in T. Liebes and J. Curran (eds.) Media 
Ritual and Identity, London, Routledge, 168–74 
 
Gans, H. (2010) ‗News and the news media in the digital age: implications for democracy‘ 
Daedalus, Journal of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences Vol. 139, No. 2, Pages 8-17 
 
Goffman, E. (1974) Frame Analysis Cambridge Mass., Harvard University Press. 
 
Golding, G., Murdock, G., and Schlesinger, P., (1986) Communicating politics: mass 
communications and the political process Leicester, Leicester University Press 
 
Goode, L.  (2005) Jürgen Habermas: Democracy and the Public Sphere London, Pluto Press 
 
Gripsud, J. and Moe, H. (2010) The Digital Public Sphere: Challenges for Media Policy, 
Gothenburg, Nordicom 
 
Gurevitch, M., Levy, M. and Roeh, I. (1991) ‗The Global Newsroom: convergences and 
diversities in the globalization of television news‘ in Dahlgren, P. and Sparks. C. 
Communication and Citizenship: journalism and the public sphere Routledge, London 
 
Gurevitch, M., Coleman, S. and Blumler J (2009) ‗Political Communication: Old and New 
Media Relationships‘ Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science Vol. 
62.5, 164–81. 
 
Habermas, J. (1989) The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: an inquiry into a 
category of bourgeois society Translated by Burger, T. with Lawrence, F. Cambridge, Polity 
Press  
 
Hall, S. (1978) Policing the Crisis: mugging, the state, and law and order London, Holmes 
and Meier 
 
Hansard Society (2012) Audit of Political Engagement 2012, London, Hansard Society 
 
Heffernan, R. and Marqusee, M. (1992) Defeat from the Jaws of Victory: Inside Kinnock’s 
Labour Party London Verso 
 
Hencke D  (2009) ‗Why a Commons club fouled up‘  British Journalism Review Vol. 20, No. 
3, 51 – 56 
 
Hencke D. (2011) ‗A Dangerous Myth‘ British Journalism Review Vol. 22, No.  3, 43-48. 
 
Ivor Gaber: A Crisis in Political Communications? Reflections of a Critical Practitioner submitted as part of a PhD by Prior Publication 
 
66 
Hetherington, A., Weaver, K. and Ryle, M. (1990) Television in Politics: The Study for The 
Hansard Society on the Televising of the House of Commons London, Hansard Society  
 
Ipsos Mori (2011) ‗Doctors are most trusted profession – politicians least trusted 
Trust in Professions 2011‘ Ipsos Mori website available on: 
http://www.ipsos-mori.com/researchpublications/researcharchive/2818/Doctors-are-most-
trusted-profession-politicians-least-trusted.aspx Accessed 08/05/2013 
 
Jackson, D. (2011) ‗Strategic news frames and public policy debates: press and television 
news coverage of the Euro in the UK‘ Communications Vol.  36 No. 2, 169-194  
 
Jones, N. (1995) Soundbites and Spin Doctors how politicians manipulate the media and vice 
versa London, Cassell  
 
Jones, N. (1999) Sultans of Spin London, Orion Publishing  
 
Jones, N. (2002) The Control Freaks: how New Labour gets its own way London, Politico‘s,  
 
Kavanagh, D. and Butler, D. (2005) The British General Election of 2005 Basingstoke, 
Palgrave Macmillan 
 
Keeble, R. and Mair, J. (eds.) (2013) After Leveson: the Future of British Journalism Bury St 
Edmunds, Abramis Academic 
 
Kovach, B. and Rosenstiel, T. (2007) The Elements of Journalism: what news people should 
know and the public should expect New York, Three Rivers Publishing 
 
Labour Party (2013) News Archive on http://www.labour.org.uk/news Accessed 28/04/2013 
 
Leveson, B. (2012) An Inquiry into the Culture Practices and Ethics of the Press Vol. 3 
London HMSO available online at:  
http://www.official-documents.gov.uk/document/hc1213/hc07/0780/0780.asp Accessed 
28/04/2013 
 
Lloyd, J. (2004) What the Media is Doing to Our Politics London, Constable and Robinson 
 
Margaretten, M. and Gaber, I. (2012) ‗The Crisis in Public Communication and the Pursuit of 
Authenticity: an analysis of the Twitter feeds of Scottish MPs 2008–2010‘ Parliamentary 
Affairs Published Online August 7, 2012 available at: 
http://pa.oxfordjournals.org/content/early/2012/08/07/pa.gss043.abstract Accessed 
05/05/2013 
 
Margach, J. (1978) The abuse of power: the war between Downing Street and the media from 
Lloyd George to Callaghan London, W. H. Allen 
 
Marks, P. (2000) ‗In Bush–Gore race, 3 words for the media: ―You‘ve Got Mail‖‘ the New 
York Times on the Web‘, 01/06/2000 
 
Mattinson, D. (2010) ‗The Power of the Focus Group‘ Total Politics August 2010  
 
Ivor Gaber: A Crisis in Political Communications? Reflections of a Critical Practitioner submitted as part of a PhD by Prior Publication 
 
67 
McBride, S. for UNESCO(1980) Communication and Society Today and Tomorrow, Many 
Voices One World, Towards a new more just and more efficient world information and 
communication order  London, Kogan Page 
 
McCombs, M. and Shaw, D. (1972) ‗The Agenda-Setting Function of Mass Media‘ Public 
Opinion Quarterly Vol. 36 No. 2, 176-187. 
 
McCombs, M.  (2004) Setting the Agenda: The Mass Media and Public Opinion, Cambridge, 
Polity Press 
 
McKnight, D. (2013) Murdoch's Politics: how one man's thirst for wealth and power shapes 
our world London, Pluto Press 
 
McNair, B. (2000) Journalism and Democracy; an evaluation of the political public sphere 
Routledge, London  
 
McNair, B. (2003) An Introduction to Political Communications, London, Routledge 
 
McSmith, A. (2012) ‗Revealed: Murdoch's secret meeting with Mrs Thatcher before he 
bought The Times’  the  Independent 17/03/2012 
 
Murphy, J. (2013) ‗MPs are Bottom of the Pile When it comes to Trust‘ Evening Standard 
15/02/2013 
Newman, N. (2011) Mainstream media and the distribution of news in the age of social 
discovery Oxford, Reuters‘ Institute for the Study of Journalism 
 
Noelle-Neumann, E. (1993) The Spiral of Silence: public opinion - our social skin 
Chicago, University of Chicago Press 
 
Norris, P. et al (1999) On Message: Communicating the Campaign London, Sage   
 
Norris, P. (2000) The Virtuous Circle: Political Communications in Post Industrial Societies 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press  
 
Norris, P. (2006) ‗Did the Media Matter? Agenda-Setting, Persuasion and Mobilization 
Eﬀects in the British General Election Campaign‘ British Politics, Vol. 1 No. 2, 195–221 
 
Norris, P. (2008) Driving Democracy: do power-sharing institutions work? Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press 
 
OFCOM (2011) International Communications Market Report 2011 London, OFCOM 
 
Papacharissi, Z. (2004) ‗Democracy online: civility, politeness, and the democratic potential 
of online political discussion groups‘ New Media and Society Vol. 6 No.2, 259–283 
 
Parliament Street and Deach, P. (2012) @Parliament: the failure of MPs to connect on 
Twitter Parliament Street paper at http://www.parliamentstreet.org/research/socialmedia.pdf 
Accessed 03/05/2013 
 
Patterson, T. (1994) Out of Order New York, Vintage Books  
Ivor Gaber: A Crisis in Political Communications? Reflections of a Critical Practitioner submitted as part of a PhD by Prior Publication 
 
68 
 
Postman, N. (1985) Amusing Ourselves to Death Amusing ourselves to death: public 
discourse in the age of show business London, Methuen 
 
Power Inquiry (2006) Power to the People. The Report of Power: an independent inquiry into 
Britain’s democracy London, the Power Inquiry   
 
Price, L. (2005) Spin Doctor's Diary: Inside Number 10 with New Labour, London, Hodder 
and Stoughton  
 
Public Administration Select Committee (1999) The Government Information and 
Communication Service London, House of Commons 
 
Ruddock, A. (2007) Investigating Audiences London, Sage 
 
Schlesinger, P. (1990) ‗Rethinking the sociology of journalism: source strategies and the 
limits of media-centrism‘ in Ferguson, M. (ed.) Public Communication: the New Imperatives 
London Sage 
 
Schlesinger, P. and Tumber, H. (1994) Reporting Crime: The Media Politics of Criminal 
Justice Oxford, Oxford University Press 
 
Semetko, H. Et al (1991) The Formation of Campaign Agendas: A Comparative Analysis of 
Party and Media Roles in Recent American and British Elections Hillsdale, NJ, Lawrence 
Erlbaum Associates 
 
Seymour-Ure, C. (1968) The Press, Politics and the Public London, Methuen 
 
Seymour-Ure, C. (1977) ‗Parliament and Government‘ in Boyd-Barrett, O, Seymour-Ure, C 
and Tunstall, J. Studies on the Press Royal Commission on the Press London, HMSO  
 
Sampson, A. (1996) ‗The Crisis at the Heart of Our Media‘ British Journalism Review Vol. 17 
No. , 42-51 
 
Silverstone, R. (2006) Media and Morality: On the Rise of the Mediapolis London, Wiley  
 
Smith A. (1776) The Wealth of Nations downloadable at: http://metalibri.wikidot.com/title:an-
inquiry-into-the-nature-and-causes-of-the-wealth-of Accessed 09/05/2013 
 
Smith, J. (2005) Election 2005, London, Politico‘s. 
 
Sparrow, A. (2003) Obscure Scribblers: a History of Parliamentary Journalism London, 
Politico‘s 
 
Stanyer, J. (2004) Modern Political Communications: mediated politics in uncertain terms 
Cambridge, Polity Press 
 
Staines, P. (2013) ‗About Guido‘s Blog‘ on Order-Order Guido Fawkes’ Blog available on:   
(http://order-order.com/2004/01/09/about-guidos-blog/ Accessed 09/05/2013 
 
Ivor Gaber: A Crisis in Political Communications? Reflections of a Critical Practitioner submitted as part of a PhD by Prior Publication 
 
69 
Strömbäck, J., 2008, ‗Four Phases of Mediatization: an analysis of the mediatization of 
politics International Journal of Press/Politics, Vol. 13, 228-246. 
 
Temple, M. (2006) ‗Dumbing Down is Good for You‘ British Politics, 2006, Vol. 1, 257–273 
 
Thatcher, M. (1993) The Downing Street Years London, Harper Collins 
 
Tumber, H. (2001) ‗Democracy in the information age: the role of the fourth estate in 
cyberspace‘ Information, Communication and Society Vol. 4, No.1, 95–112 
 
Tunstall, J. (1996) Newspaper Power Oxford, Clarendon Press 
 
Tunstall, J. (1970) The Westminster Lobby Correspondents: a sociological study of national 
political journalism London, Routledge and Kegan Paul 
 
Tunstall, J. (1977) The Media are American: Anglo-American media in the world 
London, Constable 
 
Watt, N. and Wintour, P. (2010) ‗Campaign 2010: Media: coalition attacking TV coverage 
collapses Guardian 26/04/2010  
 
Wells, M. (2005) ‗Paxman Answers the Questions‘ Guardian 31/01/2005 
 
Winston, B. (1998) Media Technology and Society London, Routledge 
 
Wright, T. (1999) 'Inside the Whale: the Media from Parliament', in J. Seaton (ed.) Politics 
and the Media: Harlots and Prerogatives at the Turn of the Millennium, Oxford Blackwell, 
19-27 
 
Wring, D. (2005) The Politics of Marketing the Labour Party Basingstoke, Palgrave 
Macmillan 
 
 
Websites  
Conservative Home http://conservativehome.blogs.com/ 
Friends of Israel in UKIP‖  
http://www.facebook.com/pages/Friends-of-Israel-in-UKIP/111727452249341?fref=ts  
Huffington Post http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/ 
Labour Party News Archive on http://www.labour.org.uk/news 
Order-Order Guido Fawkes‘ Blog - http://order-order.com/ 
The Commentator http://www.thecommentator.com 
Tweetminster http://tweetminster.co.uk/mps 
YouGov http://yougov.co.uk/news 
 
                                                             
 
ENDNOTES 
 
Ivor Gaber: A Crisis in Political Communications? Reflections of a Critical Practitioner submitted as part of a PhD by Prior Publication 
 
70 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
i
  Originally a legal term relating to the sale of goods Act but entered into the political sphere in 1993 when 
the then Home Secretary John Reid, described the Home Office in these terms: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/5007148.stm accessed 3 April 2013 
 
ii
  This is not a 'Veblenist' techno-determinist argument, suggesting that changes in technology have made 
changes in the political public sphere inevitable; but nor is it to deny that technology can, in certain 
circumstances change, not just the quantity of information in circulation but its content as well. Brian 
Winston‘s argument is persuasive that whilst technologies evolve gradually their profile and application is 
always shaped by societal pressures, which tend to initially resist technologies that are seen as potentially 
subversive. (Winston 1998)   The Internet for example – the concept of a global distributed network of 
computers – was first developed for the US military in the 1960s but it took another 30 to 40 years before 
it began to make a substantive impact on the wider public.  
 
iii
   Between 1978 and 2010 I have worked as a political reporter, producer and programme editor for BBC 
TV and Radio, ITN, Channel Four News and Sky News. 
 
iv
  ‗Order- Order‘ can be Accessed at http://order-order.com/  
 
v
 Huffington Post can be Accessed at http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/ 
 
vi
  Conservative Home can be Accessed at http://conservativehome.blogs.com/ 
 
vii
  Friends of Israel in UKIP‖ can be Accessed at  
http://www.facebook.com/pages/Friends-of-Israel-in-UKIP/111727452249341?fref=ts accessed 9/04/2013 
 
viii
 British National Party warns, "Beware UKIP Zionists" by The Commentator Accessed 09/04/ 2013  
 
ix
  Tweetminster is a media platform that analyses trends and links around Twitter in relation to UK politics 
and current affairs.  Latest figures to be found at http://tweetminster.co.uk/mps reveal that there are 174 
Labour MPs with Twitter accounts, 171 Conservatives, 44 Liberal Democrats and 20 from other parties.    
 
x
 This paper – Margaretten and Gaber (2012) is not being submitted as part of this PhD. 
 
xi
 Since publication of the Parliament Street paper in October 2012 Dai Havard‘s followers are now up to 
83 but he is (at the time of writing April 2013) yet to tweet. Tom Watson‘s followers are now approaching 
120,000 and he is still tweeting many times a day. –Twitter.com/daihavard and Twitter.com/tom_watson 
accessed 3 April 2013 
 
xii
  All the submitted pieces involve an element of ―retrospective reflexivity‖, to a greater or lesser extent. 
 
xiii
  This report for UNESCO called for efforts to be made to recalibrate the flow of news from North to 
South. It had major international ramifications which led to the US and the UK withdrawing from the 
organisation. 
 
xiv
 The Mass Media and Global Environmental Learning Grant reference: L320253059 
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xv
  The Power Inquiry was established in 2004. It was an independent inquiry into Britain's democracy, 
chaired by Helena Kennedy QC and funded by the Joseph Rowntree Reform Trust, its report ‗Power to 
the people; was published in 2006. 
 
xvi
  See Keeble and Mair (2013) for a range of contributions to the post-Leveson debate. 
 
xvii
  See Jackson (2011) who, as a marketing academic, brings a different perspective to bear on this debate. 
 
xviii
  My argument that the 2010 election had been virtually ‗policy free‘ was contested by Sky News‘ 
Political Editor, Adam Boulton, in Boulton (2012), who argued that the three televised leaders‘ debates 
represented a significant policy input into the campaign. I suggest, and suggested directly to Boulton, 
that the content of the debates made little impact on the media‘s reporting of the election which 
remained fixated on the ‗horse race‘; even the reporting of the debates was in terms of who won or lost 
rather than what was said. 
 
xix
 Quoted in  Mattinson (2010) 
 
xx
 According to an iCG poll for Press Gazette  (31/03/2010) respondents, asked to name the print 
publication, broadcast news outlet or website, ―you most trust when it comes to political news‖ responded:  
1 - BBC News (online, TV and radio): (50.3 per cent) 
2 - Sky News (6.5 per cent) 
3 - ITV national news (5.3 per cent) 
4 - I trust no-one when it comes to political news (five per cent) 
5 - ITV regional news (3.7 per cent) 
6 - The Times (3.3 per cent) 
7 - Daily Mail (2.5 per cent) 
8 - Channel 4 News (2.3 per cent) 
9 - The Daily Telegraph (1.9 per cent) 
10 - The Guardian (1.8 per cent) 
 
xxi According to the Hansard Audit of Political Engagement 2012, 42% of the public say they are interested 
in politics – this is down 16 points since 2011 and the lowest level ever recorded in the nine-year Audit 
series). 
 
xxii YouGov Poll 3 May 2013 ―Which of the following list best reflects your reasons for voting UKIP? 
(Please tick up to three) Want immigration reduced 76%, Want Britain to leave EU 59%. Unhappy with 
major parties 47%, Unhappy with Cameron Government 25%‖ Accessed at: 
http://yougov.co.uk/news/2013/05/03/immigration-and-europe-give-ukip-appeal/ 
 
xxiii
  The latest YouGiv poll puts 13/05/2013) puts Labour on 38%, the Conservatives on 31%, UKIP on 
14%;  and the Liberal Democrats on 10% available at http://yougov.co.uk/news/2013/05/14/update-labour-
lead-7/  Accessed 14/05/2013. 
 
